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I. Introduction
The growth' of consumer instalment credit2 has paralleled that of
1. Commentators have attributed the growth of consumer instalment
credit to: population expansion, increased job security, rising income, J.
CHAPMAN & R. SHAY, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUSTRY: ITS COSTS AND
REGULATION 2-3 (1967); a decline of rugged individualism, sophisticated
marketing practices of creditors and a basic market structure shift from
capital goods to consumer products, B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER
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two other twentieth century hallmarks-mass production and the
automobile. Amounts outstanding under consumer instalment cred-
it rose from under one billion dollars in 19181 to over one hundred
and nine billion dollars at the end of 1971.1 Motor vehicle retail
instalment sales paper had a major role in this growth, contributing
more than one third of all outstanding consumer credit for over forty
years.'
As mass production of consumer goods captured commercial mar-
kets, creditor practices and contracts for financing purchases be-
came increasingly standardized. In 1931 Karl Llewellyn noted that
"the tendency when standardized contracts are used has seemed
. . . to be . . . accumulation of seller-protective instead of
customer-protective clauses." ' A modern commentator is more
blunt: "The effect of mass production and mass merchandising is
to make all consumer forms standard and the . . . effect of econom-
ics and the present law is to make all standard forms unfair."7
CREDIT LEGISLATION 1 (1965); the rise of "conspicuous" and "compensa-
tory" consumption, D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 13 (1963); and
increased individual preference for ownership of items fulfilling transpor-
tation, domestic, and recreational needs, Warren, Regulation of Finance
Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839 (1959). See also
Mussehl, The Neighborhood Consumer Center: Relief for the Consumer at
the Grass-Roots Level, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1093, 1114-15 (1972).
2. Consumer instalment credit includes "cover loans to individuals for
household, family, and other personal expenditures; except real estate
mortgage loans." 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. A56 (explanatory note) (1972).
3. B. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 1 n.2.
4. 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. A56 (1972).
5. Motor vehicle retail instalment contracts totaled 44% of consumer
credit outstanding in 1929, 33% in 1939, B. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 1 n.2;
41% in 1950, and 35% in 1971 (based on statistics in 58 FED. RESERVE BULL.
A56-57 (1972)).
6. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE
L.J. 704, 734 (1931). Llewellyn was the architect of early drafts of the
Uniform Commercial Code and to a degree his philosophy permeates the
modern law of sales and contracts. See Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of
Which Karl N. Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; or Searching for More
Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 139 (1970).
7. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530-31 (1970). "Mass production and
mass merchandising work to make all forms standard because a non-
MOTOR VEHICLE SALES
Because of its role in the growth of consumer credit, the develop-
ment of creditor practices and the evolution of credit regulations,
the motor vehicle retail instalment sale' serves as a good base for
analysing the instalment credit marketplace. Generally, a car buyer
has three options when financing his purchase; he may pay cash,
borrow from a third-party lender,9 or purchase the car on credit from
the dealer and execute a motor vehicle retail instalment contract
with him.' The third option, the motor vehicle retail instalment
standard form is characteristically just as expensive for a seller to make
and sell as is a non-standard tangible product. In either case he loses the
ability to spread his costs of 'production'-legal or mechanical-over a
large number of products. The rational decision is therefore normally
either not to offer non-standard products or to charge much higher prices
for them." Id. at 531. Were non-standard forms used, the buyer would bear
his and the seller's increased costs. Therefore, any "benefits a buyer could
obtain . . . by negotiating a non-standard form could . . . be obtained
more easily and less expensively in other ways. If he wanted increased
warranty protection, for example, a buyer could probably obtain the same
protection less expensively by purchasing insurance to cover the risks
which would be covered by an expanded warranty. Even more simply, he
could just pay the extra unreimbursed repair costs himself." Id.
8. See notes 10 and 53 infra.
9. While such a transaction involves the same parties as a motor ve-
hicle retail instalment sale, it is regulated by general banking and small
loan laws and therefore is not discussed in this comment. See generally
Comment, Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1409 (1972).
10. See Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A
Journey to the Underworld and a Proposed Salvation, 51 OREGON L. REV.
302 (1972). Professor Philip Shuchman lists five basic types of "dealer-
financer agreements for disposition of the dealer's paper: (1) nonrecourse;
(2) full recourse; (3) full repurchase; (4) limited repurchase; and (5) op-
tional repuchase." Under the first the dealer has no legal obligation to the
financer in the event of the consumer's default. Under the second the
dealer "agrees to repurchase the chattel paper for the balance due in the
event of default. The burden is thus on the dealer to repossess . . . resell
it, and . . . proceed against the consumer for a deficiency judgment. Or,
the dealer may ignore the collateral and simply institute suit against the
consumer for the balance due plus the vigorish allowed under state stat-
utes." Under a full-repurchase agreement "the financer usually repossesses
the car, delivers it to the dealer, and then assigns all his rights in the
chattel paper to the dealer who pays the financer the balance due on the
retail installment contract." The limited repurchase plan is similar "ex-
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contract, is the subject of this comment. The terms of these con-
tracts are determined by the financer and dealer, "[b]uyers have
almost no influence on these legal arrangements."" The agreements
are significant because of their impact on consumer credit develop-
ment, the abuses they have engendered, and the pattern of regula-
tion which has grown around them.
II. History of the Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales
Market
A. Manufacturer v. Private Financers
The history of the motor vehicle retail instalment sales market-
place helps explain its present complexity. From the beginning of
automobile sales, dealers have lacked cash to buy cars from manu-
facturers, and consumers have lacked cash to pay dealers.
Manufacturer-sponsored financing agencies and independent fin-
ancers competed for the consumer paper, while dealers sought cheap
cept that the dealer obligates himself for the balance due . . . only up to
a specified maximum." Under the "optional-repurchase agreement, the
financer may, and in some instances must, repossess the car. The dealer
then buys the car from the financer either at a price fixed in advance, or
for the balance due on the chattel paper, which will be the maximum fixed
price. The financer or the dealer will then proceed against the consumer."
Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Reposses-
sion and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 25 (1969) (footnote omitted). Of the
$38,310,000,000 in "automobile paper" outstanding at the end of 1971,
automobile dealers held only $360,000,000 while commercial banks held
$13,003,000,000 purchased from others and $8,752,000,000 acquired di-
rectly; finance companies held $10,279,000,000 and "other lenders" held
$5,916,000,000. 58 FED. RESERVE BULL. A56-57. See also Warren, supra note
1, at 840.
11. Shuchman, supra note 10, at 26. Professor Shuchman says "[tihe
• . .economic arrangement . . .reflects a compromise [between retailer
and financer]." In all but non-recourse financing, dealers maintain "a
reserve account made up of the accumulated rebates of finance charges
and commissions from the sale of. . .insurance . . ." The more protec-
tion a dealer gets, the lower his rebate. Id. at 25-26. (footnote omitted).
The bargaining may involve the parties' entire financial relationship. A
dealer seeks adequate financing of floor stock and uses consumer paper as
a tool to arrange it. Manufacturer-financers can use their power over rebate
accounts to insure that dealers follow their policies. See Brown, A Bill of
Rights for Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 757, 772-73 (1971).
[Vol. HI
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ways to finance floor stock. In United States v. General Motors
Corp.,'" GM's financing activities were found to be antitrust viola-
tions, and the history of General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC) was traced:
[General Motors] first realized the importance of financing the commerce
in automobiles in 1919, but at that time the position of the motorcar was not
secure and discount companies were reluctant to loan money on automobiles
except on exorbitant terms. Consequently GMAC was created to finance the
wholesale and retail sales of General Motors cars, and from 1919 to 1925 it
developed a retail plan of installment selling based on dealer indorsement of
retail paper (recourse liability), adequate down payment (approximately one
third of the selling price), and payment of the balance within a reasonable
period of time (usually twelve months). Generally and briefly, [GMACI
objections to non-recourse and to "extreme terms," that is, smaller down
payments and longer terms, [generally offered by independent financers],
were that these features increased repossession and losses incident thereto,
enhanced finance charges and formed a 'glut' on the used car market. 3
Independent sales finance companies, competing with GMAC,
offered dealers attractive non-recourse financing, relieving them
from repurchase liability if the buyer defaulted. In addition, other
benefits including financing of floor inventory were offered.' 4 In
1925, faced with the shift of many California dealers to independent
finance companies, GM intensified efforts to encourage financing
through GMAC, by offering "dealer participation" plans whereby a
"repossession loss reserve" compensated dealers for bad debts re-
purchased under recourse financing. The return more than compen-
sated dealers: "experience over a period of five years shows the
reserve set up was twice the amount necessary to pay repossession
losses . . . . [I]t constitutes additional profit to the dealer and...
is so advertised to the dealer body."' 5
Professor Warren noted that "in the sales-finance world" dealer
participation "proved to be the rough equivalent of the invention of
the wheel."'" Ford and Chrysler soon entered the sales financing
dealer participation market, and antitrust actions ensued. Although
Ford and Chrysler submitted to consent decrees, terminating affilia-
12. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
13. 121 F.2d at 391-92.
14. See Skilton, Cars for Sale: Some Comments on the Wholesale Fi-
nancing of Automobiles, 1957 Wis. L. REV. 352, 359-60.
15. 121 F.2d at 391.
16. Warren, supra note 1, at 857.
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tion with their finance companies, these decrees were conditioned
on the divestiture of GMAC. 7
GM refused to drop GMAC. It lost a criminal prosecution for
conspiracy to restrain interstate trade for attempting "to control the
financing essential to the wholesale purchase and retail sale of Gen-
eral Motors cars" and for carrying on "concerted action by which
GMAC financing was imposed on dealers who were engaged in the
purchase and sale" of those cars. 8 In a subsequent civil case GM,
by consent decree," agreed not to discriminate against dealers who
used independent sales finance companies. None of these actions
led to divestiture of GMAC. °
B. The Decline of Usury
1. The Time-Price Doctrine
The legal foundations of modem instalment credit lie in the suc-
cessful revolt of nineteenth century proponents of economic freedom
against traditional usury principles.2' Their arguments persuaded
the courts to narrow the definition of "loan or forebearance" under
the usury laws to exclude a seller's extension of credit to a buyer.22
Implicitly, the seller was viewed as having set two different
prices-a cash price charged when payments were made at the time
17. United States v. Ford Motor Co., CCH TRADE CAS. 55,195 (N.D.
Ind. 1938).
18. 121 F.2d at 382-83.
19. United States v. General Motors Corp., CCH TRADE CAS. 67,324
(N.D. Ill. 1952).
20. Id. See generally, Note, Is Control of Dealer Participation A Neces-
sary Adjunct to Regulation of Installment Sales Financing?, 28 IND. L.J.
641 (1953); Hardy, Another View on the Origin of Dealer Participation in
Automobile Finance Charges, 30 IND. L.J. 311 (1955); Pecar, Dealer Partic-
ipation in Automobile Finance Charges: A Reply, 30 IND. L.J. 319 (1955).
(These three works are a dialogue on the effects of dealer participation on
the automobile sales finance market). See also Skilton, supra note 14.
21. See 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100-13 (1926);
Deuteronomy 23:20 (prohibiting, except to foreigners, all loans of "money,
food, or anything else"); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulations: A
Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 446-47 (1968).
22. Warren, supra note 1, at 841 n.11, cites Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S.
(1 Black) 115 (1861) as the leading American case and Beete v. Bidgood, 7
B. & C. 453, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827) as the pioneer British case.
See also Brooks v. Avery, 4 N.Y. 225 (1850).
[Vol. 11
MOTOR VEHICLE SALES
of sale and a time-sales price set when it was not. 3 This develop-
ment removed a longstanding obstacle to the growth of instalment
credit and provided the necessary legal rationale for the growth of
consumer credit.
The time-price doctrine was well suited to the needs of the fledg-
ling auto industry. The dealer would be able to offer automobiles
to customers at higher prices payable over a period of time. Finan-
cers would profit from underwriting the sales, and manufacturers
would gain from increased sales. The time-price doctrine thus be-
came the basis of the modern motor vehicle retail instalment sales
market and a strong influence on the pattern of its regulation.24
2. Small Loan Laws
Courts continued to recognize that third party loans to a buyer
were clearly within the scope of usury laws. Economic thinkers of
this formative era argued that the expense and risk of lending made
23. "A vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expect-
ancy, and a purchaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit,
and one who will not distinguish between things that differ may say, with
apparent truth, that B pays a hundred percent for forbearance, and may
assert that such a contract is usurious, but whatever truth there may be
in the premises, the conclusion is manifestly erroneous. Such a contract
has none of the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or
forbearance of a debt." Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 119 (1861).
24. See notes 38-40, 212-43, 273 infra and accompanying text. The
underlying assumptions of the time-price doctrine are questionable in the
twentieth century economy. A farmer's supplier in the nineteenth century
might set two prices on plows, but a modern merchant generally adds a
fixed finance charge, with little consideration of the item or customer.
Further, nineteenth century courts assumed that while one might take a
loan out of necessity, one only purchased on credit for luxury. Their moral
outrage against high finance charges was therefore dampened. Today, the
situation is often reversed-one buys on credit when bank loans are not
available or not perceived to be available. See Warren, supra note 1, at 842-
43. The time-price doctrine was recently rejected in State v. J.C. Penney
Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970). Contra, Sliger v. R.H. Macy
& Co., 59 N.J. 465, 283 A.2d 904 (1971). The threat posed by modern
judicial inroads into the time-price doctrine was a factor motivating sup-
porters of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as
UCCC], a comprehensive statute proposed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Littlefield, The Plight of the Con-
sumer in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 48 DENV. L.J. 1, 10 (1971).
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extension of small loans within usury limits unprofitable."3 Russell
Sage Foundation studies in 1908 and 1909 confirmed the difficulties
of expanding the small loan market given the usury framework. 6 As
a result of these studies, the Uniform Small Loan Law was recom-
mended to the states in 1916.27 Most states soon passed variations
of the Uniform Law. Generally, these required licensing of small
loan financers, allowing interest rates to exceed usury levels and
limiting some collection practices."
C. The Rise of Regulation
Dealers' need for liquidity,2 financers' need for profit,30 consumer
naivete about the true cost of credit,"1 a rising demand market,32 and
the relative freedom afforded by the time-price doctrine33 resulted
in abuses." Legislation was enacted in an effort to curb these abuses
as early as 1935 in Indiana35 and Wisconsin. 6 Most states did not
join them until the mid-1950s.37
Early credit regulation cannot be attributed to vigilant consumer
advocates. Finance companies supported control to civilize their
hyper-competitive industry, and to limit the anticipated judicial or
legislative regulation.3" Model bills prepared or influenced by credi-
25. F. HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAws 1 (1938).
26. Id. at 1-2.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. Small loan laws were enacted by Mass. (1911); N.J. (1914);
Neb. (1915); N.Y. (1915); Ohio (1915); Pa. (1915); Ill. (1917); Ind. (1917);
Me. (1917); N.H. (1917); Utah (1917); Md. (1918); Va. (1918); Ariz. (1919);
Colo. (1919); Conn. (1919); Ga. (1920); Iowa (1921); Mich. (1921); R.I.
(1923); Fla. (1925); W. Va. (1925); Mo. (1927); Wis. (1927); La. (1928); Cal.
(1931); Ore. (1931); Ala. (1932); Ky. (1934); Tenn. (1937); Vt. (1937). Id.
at 219-23. All states except Arkansas now have some form of statutory
small loan regulation. See 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 540.
29. See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 11-20 supra and accompanying text.
31. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 13-15 and sources cited therein;
notes 60-63 infra and accompanying text.
32. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
34. See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
35. Law of March 11, 1935, ch. 231, [1935] Ind. Laws 1206.
36. Law of Sept. 19, 1935, ch. 474, [1935] Wis. Laws 748.
37. See 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 520.
38. See Britton & Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Instalment Sales
[Vol. II
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tor interests have had considerable effect on recent" as well as
early4' legislation.
In 1951 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promulgated lim-
ited trade practice guides.4' These termed certain misrepresen-
tations42 as unfair trade practices and required an itemized state-
ment of charges. 3 Since the Commission's jurisdiction reaches only
to interstate commerce," the guides had little value for consumers.
They were further weakened when the FTC indicated it would not
enforce them where comparable state regulation existed.45 The as-
sumption underlying state and federal regulation in the 1950s was
that abuses were aberrations and could be remedied by informing
the consumer of his rights and prohibiting a few offensive prac-
tices. " Recently, this assumption has been challenged."
Act-Historical Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw. U.L.
REV. 137, 150 (1958); Cavers, The Consumer Stake in the Finance Com-
pany Code Controversy, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 200 (1935); Gilmore, The
Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 27, 37-38 (1951).
39. See Britton & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 150; Shick, Storm Warning:
A "Revised" UCCC, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 463 (1972). But see Murphy,
Lawyers for the Poor View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 298, 299-300
(1969).
40. See note 38 supra. Partners in the firm representing Household
Finance Corp. were "associated directly or indirectly with the preparation
of most [small loan] legislation" as early as 1909. F. HUBACHECK, supra
note 25, at vi.
41. 16 C.F.R. §§ 197.1-.5 (1973). The guide was issued pursuant to the
FTC's power "to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from
using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
42. 16 C.F.R. § 197.1-.4 (1973).
43. Id. § 197.2.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
45. Jones, The Inner City Marketplace: The Need for Law and Order,
37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1015, 1017-18 (1969). Note, Protection of Automo-
bile Installment Buyers: The FTC Steps In, 61 YALE L.J. 718, 725 n.31
(1952). The guides may have been an impetus to state action. Britton &
Ulrich, supra note 38, at 151.
46. See note 59 infra and accompanying text. This attitude was mani-
fested by the New York State Consumer Council's reaction to the passage
of the Retail Instalment Sales Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 401-22
(McKinney 1962), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973) [hereinafter re-
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III. The New York Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act
The New York Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act
(MVRISA),4" enacted in 1956, responded to some abuses then per-
ceived to be common. It represents part of an early attempt to
achieve comprehensive regulation of consumer credit." The Act,
ferred to as RISA] (regulating non-motor vehicle retail instalment sales
contracts). The group said: "For the first time in this, or any other state,
the law now gives protection to the buyer of goods and related services
under any instalment sales plan." Memorandum of Consumer Council to
the Governor, reprinted, [1957] N.Y. Laws 2113. The caveat to this an-
nouncement placed a substantial burden on consumers. "[Y]ou must
KNOW THE LAW to take full advantage of this protection, and READ
YOUR CONTRACT." Id. The status of consumerism in the mid-1950s is
indicated by the fact that New York did not have a "high State Govern-
ment official . . .concerned exclusively with the protection and welfare
of consumers" until 1955. Annual Message of Governor Harriman to the
Legislature 22, 1 N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 Annual
Message].
47. Littlefield, supra note 24, at 12.
48. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 301-15 (McKinney 1962), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
49. Savage, Commercial Law, 1958 Survey of American Law, 34
N.Y.U.L. REV. 189, 190 (1959); Britton & Ulrich, supra note 38, at 151-52;
B. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 91-123. With the enactment of a Sales Finance
Law in 1956 (as codified in N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 451-502 (McKinney
1962), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973)), and the Retail Instalment
Sales Act in 1957 (as codified in N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 401-22 (McKin-
ney 1962), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973)), New York became the
first state to regulate the entire sales finance industry. Memorandum of
Consumer Council, supra note 46, at 2113; Britton & Ulrich, supra
note 38, at 153. Under the Sales Finance Law a "sales finance com-
pany" covered by the licensing requirement originally included "a retail
seller of motor vehicles engaged . . . in the business of holding retail instal-
ment contracts acquired from retail buyers." Law of April 16, 1956, ch. 635,
§ 491(7), [19561 N.Y. Laws. A 1957 amendment increased the act's scope
by including persons "engaged, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly,
in the business of purchasing or otherwise acquiring retail instalment con-
tracts, obligations or credit agreements . . .made by and between other
parties, or any interest therein." Law of April 17, 1957, ch. 598, [1957]
N.Y. Laws 1360 (emphasis omitted). The only dealers required to obtain
licenses under the amendment were those holding retail instalment con-
tracts totaling over $15,000, "exclusive of contracts repurchased from a
sales finance company or financing agency, under an agreement to repur-
[Vol. 11
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however, has not been amended sufficiently to keep pace with other
consumer reforms.
Prior to MVRISA's adoption, the chief controls of retail instal-
ment sales were modest restrictions of the terms in conditional sales
contracts ' and chattel mortgages. 5" In his 1956 Annual Message to
the Legislature, Governor Harriman indicated concern about unfair
and unreasonable penalties on default, fraudulent trade practices
and "excessive finance and service charges in the field of instalment
sales . . . charges of various types added to the original cash price
often [resulting] in a total which is far out of line with the risk
assumed by the seller."52 That same year MVRISA was passed to
regulate instalment sales53 of motor vehicles54 by retail sellers5 5 to
chase in case of default entered into as an incident to the bona fide sale
thereof to a sales finance company or financing agency. Id. at 1360 (empha-
sis omitted). The $15,000 minimum has since been raised to $25,000. N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 491(7) (McKinney 1971).
50. Law of April 28, 1941, ch. 866, § 64-a, [1941] N.Y. Laws 1974-75,
as amended, Law of May 11, 1942, ch. 807, § 3, [1942] N.Y. Laws 1734
(repealed 1964).
51. Law of April 28, 1941, ch. 856, § 239-i, [1941] N.Y. Laws 1963, as
amended, Law of May 11, 1942, ch. 807, § 6, [1942] N.Y. Laws 1737
(repealed 1964).
52. 1956 Annual Message, supra note 46, at 23. Governor Harriman also
proposed treble damages and attorney's fees for defrauded consumers. Id.
Consumer advocates are still seeking such provisions. See Littlefield, supra
note 24, at 15. The Governor's Consumer Council noted in 1957 that even
with that year's amendments MVRISA "gives to the buyer limited protec-
tion against certain abuses." Memorandum of Consumer Council to the
Governor, reprinted, [1957] N.Y. Laws 2109 (emphasis added). One ob-
server noted at the time of passage that parts of the Act might benefit
creditors more than consumers. Atkin, Commercial Law, 1956 Survey of
N.Y. Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1419, 1421 (1956).
53. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 301(4) (McKinney 1962) defines "retail
instalment sale" as "a sale, other than for a commercial or business use
for the purpose of resale, of a motor vehicle by a retail seller to a retail
buyer for a time sale price payable in two or more instalments, payment
of which is secured by a retail instalment contract. The cash sale price of
the motor vehicle, the amount, if any, included for insurance, official fees
and credit service charge together shall constitute the time sale price."
The "cash sale price" is the "price stated in a retail instalment contract
for which the seller would sell to the buyer, and the buyer would buy from
the seller, the motor vehicle which is the subject matter of the retail instal-
1973] .. 67
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retail buyers, " financed through instalment contracts. 7
A. Disclosure and Formal Requirements of the Contract
Much of the Act is aimed at disclosing to consumers the particu-
ment contract if the sale were a sale for cash instead of a retail instalment
sale. The cash sale price may include any taxes, registration, license, and
other fees and charges for accessories and their installation and for deliver-
ing, servicing, repairing or improving the motor vehicle." Id. § 301(6).
"Official fees" include "the filing or other fees required by law to be paid
to a public officer to perfect the interest or lien, in or on a motor vehicle,
retained or taken by a seller under a retail instalment contract, and to file
or record a release, satisfaction or discharge of the contract." Id. § 301(7).
54. "Motor vehicle" or "vehicle" is "any device propelled or drawn by
any power other than muscular power, upon or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, road
or street, except that it shall not include a 'snowmobile' . . . ." N.Y. PERS.
PROP. LAW § 301(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973). This definition has been
broadly interpreted to include a mobile home under N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-302
(McKinney 1964) [hereinafter cited as UCC], necessitating filing to per-
fect a security interest. Albany Disc. Corp. v. Mohawk Nat'l Bank, 54
Misc. 2d 238, 282 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1967), modified, 30 App. Div.
2d 623, 290 N.Y.S.2d 576, aff'd on rehearing, 30 App. Div. 2d 919, 292
N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dep't 1968), afj'd, 28 N.Y.2d 222, 269 N.E.2d 809, 321
N.Y.S.2d 94 (1971).
55. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 301(3) (McKinney 1962) defines "retail
seller" as a "person who sells a motor vehicle to a retail buyer under or
subject to a retail instalment contract."
56. Id. § 301(2) defines "retail buyer" as "a person who buys a motor
vehicle from a retail seller and who executes a retail instalment contract
in connection therewith."
57. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 301(5) (McKinney Supp. 1973) defines a
"retail instalment contract" as "an agreement, entered into in this state,
pursuant to which the title to the property, or a security interest in or a
lien upon a motor vehicle, which is the subject matter of a retail instalment
sale, is retained or taken by a retail seller from a retail buyer as security,
in whole or in part, for the buyer's obligation. The term includes such an
agreement wherever entered into if executed by the buyer in this state and
if solicited in person by a salesman or other person acting on his own behalf
or that of the seller. The term also includes a contract whereby a security
interest in favor of the seller is created or retained and a contract for the
bailment or leasing of a motor vehicle by which the bailee or lessee con-
tracts to pay as compensation for its use a sum substantially equivalent
to or in excess of its value and by which it is agreed that the bailee or lessee
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lar terms of the transaction, and the basic law governing it. If disclo-
sure was not viewed as "a single panacea for all troubles in con-
sumer credit," 51 at least it was seen as a major reform of the market-
place. ' The theory behind disclosure is that consumers do not know
of hidden charges when they use retail instalment credit."0 Were
they to understand these costs they would bargain harder or shop
for credit.' The simple logic of this approach recommends it. While
most commentators agree that rate disclosure helps knowledgeable
consumers,2 they also argue that it does not help those buyers with
limited credit markets available to them, who are unaware of credit
alternatives, or who are so awed by the credit establishment that
is bound to become, or has the option of becoming, the owner of the motor
vehicle upon full compliance with the terms of the contract."
58. Kripke, supra note 21, at 445, imputes this belief to the sponsors
of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, S. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
59. The disclosure approach was advocated as early as 1935 in a study
of credit costs and methods of disclosure. Foster & Foster, Rate Aspects of
Instalment Legislation, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 189 (1935). Sales finance
companies supported state disclosure legislation after 1945 so long as it did
not include detailed insurance disclosures or heavy penalties. Gilmore,
supra note 38, at 37-38. Senator Proxmire, introducing S. 5, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) (the Truth-in-Lending Act) summarized the philosophy:
"The market system requires information in order to func-
tion-information on the part of both buyers and sellers. When informa-
tion channels become clogged, competition breaks down. The essence of
the truth-in-lending bill is to restore full information in the consumer
credit field-to insure a full disclosure of the cost of credit-and thus to
permit the market system to function more effectively." 113 CONG. REc.
2042 (1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire) [hereinafter cited as Remarks
of Senator Proxmire].
60. Remarks of Senator Proxmire 2042.
61. Id.
62. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1969). Although Professor Kripke termed the Truth-in-
Lending Act a "put on," id. at 2, he conceded that "[i]n the middle-class
areas-where the consumer has mobility; some training in shopping; some
experience in personal planning and, therefore, some restraint against im-
pulse buying; some ability at price shopping; and occasionally some under-
standing of the amount of finance charges-disclosure in a prescribed form
will undoubtedly do some good by making comparison easier. In a nation
of 200 million people, there will certainly be some who will profit from
standardized disclosure." Id. at 4.
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they seek convenience over cost. "A
Originally, MVRISA contained detailed cost disclosure require-
ments."' These provisions were deleted"' with enactment of the Fed-
eral Truth-in-Lending Act," now incorporated by reference in
MVRISA. 7 Special insurance cost disclosure provisions regulate two
types of insurance commonly found in instalment contracts-
"insurance on the motor vehicle"'' -and "group credit life insur-
ance."' Rates may not exceed the amount stated in "rate filings
63. See White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An
Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REV.
1207 (1971). The authors studied automobile buyers' attitudes toward in-
terest, concluding that in most transactions studied debtors who received
advances at the maximum rate could have borrowed at a lower rate. Al-
though some chose dealer financing because of lower down payments,
many did not consider the cost of credit, preferring the convenience of
allowing a dealer to arrange financing, or assuming they could obtain no
better terms. The study did not include analysis of poverty areas. For
analysis of that sector see D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1; FTC, ECONOMIC
REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968). "'Easy' credit . . . [p]rimarily . . . takes the
form of higher product prices." Id. at xiii. Low weekly payments and
convenience are necessary for low income consumers. Cost of credit, per
se, is not a major consideration in their purchases. D. CAPLOVrrz, supra
note 1, at 15-16, 49-80. See also McClean, The Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 24 Bus. L.Aw. 199, 206 (1968); Murphy, supra note 39, at
303-04; Smith, Some Reflections on Free Entry and the Rate Ceilings
Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 7 U. RICHMOND L. Rv. 235,
239-40 (1972).
64. Law of April 16, 1956, ch. 633, [1956] N.Y. Laws 1411.
65. Law of May 26, 1969, ch. 1141, [1969] N.Y. Laws 3030.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (1970).
67. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(5)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
68. Id. §§ 302(5)(2), (6). See Schleimer v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 65
Misc. 2d 520, 318 N.Y.S.2d 182 (Civ. Ct. 1971) indicating that a policy on
the motor vehicle protecting the seller's interest cannot be cancelled with-
out notice to him.
69. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973). "Credit
[life] insurance" is "insurance on a debtor . . . in connection with a
specific loan or other credit transaction to provide payment to the creditor
in the event of the death of the debtor or indemnity to the creditor for the
instalment payments on the indebtedness becoming due while the debtor
is disabled . . . ." N.Y. INS. LAW § 154(7) (McKinney 1966). See Gover-
nor's Memorandum, reprinted, [1958] N.Y. Laws 1836.
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made with the superintendent of insurance."7' If the actual cost of
insurance to the dealer is less than the amount stated in the con-
tract, the saving must be passed on to the consumer.7' The seller
must disclose insurance costs, 2 describe coverage, and itemize the
amounts to be paid by the consumer where the policy does not
comply with standard automobile physical damage policies. 3 A cau-
tionary warning that the insurance does not provide "coverage for
bodily injury and property damage caused to others" is also re-
quired. 71 Within thirty days of the contract's execution the seller or
financing agency must send the buyer a detailed copy of any policies
or certificates insuring the motor vehicle.7" If the buyer has exercised
70. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973). In the case
of credit life insurance, the Superintendent of Insurance has power to set
standards for chargeable rates. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Wikler, 9
N.Y.2d 524, 175 N.E.2d 147, 215 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1961). His powers are more
limited with respect to insurance on the motor vehicle. He may refuse to
approve motor vehicle rate filings which are "inadequate, excessive, un-
fairly discriminatory or otherwise unreasonable . . . ." or fail to comply
with certain provisions of law. N.Y. INs. LAW § 184(6) (McKinney 1966).
The lobbying involved in early regulation of credit life insurance was in-
tense. See generally, Tyler, Credit Life Insurance Today, 19 PERSONAL FIN.
L.Q. 60 (1964).
71. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 312 (McKinney 1962); id. § 302(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1973). See Gov. A. Harriman, Selected Special Mes-
sages to the N. Y.S. Legis., Legis. Doc. No. 6, 45, 1 N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. (1958).
As originally enacted a dealer could obtain insurance for less than charge-
able rates and not pass the savings on to consumers. See Atkin, supra note
52, at 1420. Subsequent amendments closed this loophole. For "insurance
on a motor vehicle" any difference between the amount included in the
contract and the cost to the holder together with any credit service charge
accruing from that cost must be credited to "final maturing instalments"
or applied to other insurance. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1973). In the case of group credit life, accident and health insurance,
the excess must be credited to final maturing instalments. Id. The same
crediting process applies to unearned premiums if insurance is cancelled.
N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 312 (McKinney 1962). See UCCC §§ 4.101-.304.
72. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(5) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
73. Id. N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973) sets standard
provisions.
74. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(2)(b) (McKinney 1962).
75. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973). These
policies or certificates must include "the amount of the premium, the kind
or kinds of insurance and the scope of the coverage, and all the terms,
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his option to insure through his own agent,"6 these provisions are
inoperative."
MVRISA sets type size rules for the terms of a retail instalment
contract. 6 While such requirements protect consumers from the
most reprehensible adhesion contracts," "[tjhe size of the contract
type, although a technicality prescribed by statute, is still a techni-
cality which does not reach the base of the problem." 0 Similarly,
MVRISA requires numerous written disclosures"' of the legal rights
and duties of the parties. 2 Such provisions are common in consumer
credit regulations."3 On its face the concept of informing a consumer
exceptions, limitations, restrictions and conditions of the contract or con-
tracts of insurance." Id.
76. Id. Section 302(6) grants the buyer a "privilege" of purchasing
insurance on the motor vehicle from an agent or broker of his own selection
and of selecting an insurance company acceptable to the seller. A promi-
nent notice of this "privilege" is required. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 302(2)(c) (McKinney 1962). See note 67 supra for a discussion of this
notice.
77. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973). See Atkin,
supra note 52, at 1421, for criticism of this provision.
78. N.Y. PERS. PROP LAW § 302(2) (McKinney 1962). The section pro-
vides: "[Tihe printed portion of the contract shall be in at least eight
point type." Certain notices require at least 10 point type. These include:
the buyer's acknowledgment, id. § 302(3); a cautionary warning that in-
surance under the contract does not cover "bodily injury and property
damage caused to others . . ." id. § 302(2)(b); and a specified "NOTICE
TO THE BUYER," id. § 302(2)(c). See note 67 supra. In addition, the
Federal Reserve Board requires 10 point type for certain disclosures, 12
C.F.R. § 23 (1973), pursuant to section 121 of the Federal Truth-in-
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970), which is incorporated by reference
in MVRISA, N.Y. PERS. PROP LAW § 302(5)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
79. "The 'adhesion' contract is a standardized or form agreement that
is drafted unilaterally by a dominant party and then presented to a weaker
party as the only acceptable instrument. The latter's participation in the
resultant bargain consists in his mere adherence." Shuchman, Consumer
Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 128 (1962) (Part I)
(footnote omitted). See id. at 281 (Part II); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
80. Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 403, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723, 311
N.Y.S.2d 281, 285 (1970).
81. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302(2) (McKinney 1962).
82. Id. 88 302(2)(c), (5)(2).
83. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-286 (1956); Cal. Civ. Code § 2982 (West
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of this legal status at the outset of a transaction appears praise-
worthy. However, the statements are often oversimplifications
which obscure the law, tending to confuse the consumer and to
frustrate his rights: 4
1954); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 42-84 (1958); Ga. Code Ann. § 96-903
(1972); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 476-2 (1968); Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 129
(1969); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 255D, § 9 (1969); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 445.853 (1967); N.D. Cent. Code § 51-13-02 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 83.520 (1971); S.C. Code Ann. § 46-150.33 (1971); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 63.14.040 (1966).
84. See Coburn Credit Co. v. Forlivio, 32 Misc. 2d 91, 221 N.Y.S.2d 346
(Sup. Ct. 1961) (where the language of the statutory notice to the buyer
differed from the statute's substantive provisions the court enforced the
latter). A "NOTICE TO THE BUYER" must be given under Section
302(2)(c) of MVRISA. It requires one of two alternative statements:
"NOTICE TO THE BUYER: 1. Do not sign this contract before you read
it or if it contains any blank space. 2. You are entitled to a completely filled
in copy of this contract when you sign it. 3. Under the law, you have the
following rights, among others: (a) To pay off in advance the full amount
due and to obtain a partial refund of the credit service charge; (b) To
redeem the property if repossessed for a default; (c) To require, under
certain conditions, a resale of the property if repossessed. 4. According to
law you have the privilege of purchasing the insurance on the motor vehicle
provided for in this contract from an agent or broker of your own selec-
tion." N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(2)(c) (McKinney 1962). The second
notice is identical except it omits provisions 3(b)-(c). Id. It was added by
Law of April 17, 1957, ch. 595, § 3, [1957] N.Y. Laws 1349. No reason for
the change was indicated officially. These notices are not wholly compati-
ble with the actual law. The buyer is informed that he has a right to a
"completely filled in copy of the contract. . . ." yet Section 302(8) permits
blanks for information identifying the vehicle "if delivery. . . is not made
at the time of the execution of the contract." N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§ 302(8) (McKinney 1962). Reportedly, such provisions were a compro-
mise, since merchants desired a broad sanction for blank contracts. Male-
son, Consumer Credit Regulation, 23 ALBANY L. REv. 297, 308 (1959). The
fourth disclosure informs consumers that they may purchase insurance
from their own agent. Section 302(6) adds a caveat to this "privilege." The
insurance company must be "acceptable to the seller." N.Y. PERS. PROP.
LAW § 302(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973). No requirement of reasonableness
in accepting or rejecting an alternative insurer is required of the seller. See
Atkin, supra note 52, at 1421. Blatant discrimination against certain types
of insurers is barred by N.Y. INS. LAW § 7a (McKinney Supp. 1973). No-
tices can also have substantive effects on consumers' rights, particularly
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IlInsofar as the consumer is concerned, bold language that is difficult to
understand is of no greater benefit than that appearing in fine type; neither
will be read by him. As a matter of fact, bold (but incomprehensible) lan-
guage may work against him for it may provide the basis for courts to uphold
the conscionability of such contracts . . . .'
Contracts must "be in writing ... contain all the agreements of
the parties . . . be signed by the buyer and the seller,"" include
their names and addresses, and describe the vehicle.87 The seller
must deliver a copy of the contract to the buyer. 88 The Act's most
potent remedies are applied to a failure to deliver the contract (be-
fore delivery of the vehicle)-"an unconditional right to cancel the
contract and to receive immediate refund of all payments made and
of all goods traded into the seller on account of or in contemplation
of the contract."' 8
when they detail the procedures for the redress of grievances which he is
to follow. See note 108 infra. Their oversimplified statements of the law
may discourage assertion of rights by buyers.
85. Rothschild, Consumer Protection At Last Through Local Control
of Retail Instalment Sales Contracts, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1109
(1969). See Clark, supra note 10, at 303. Consumer advocate Philip Schrag
has suggested that in light of decisions holding unconscionable English
language contracts entered into by Spanish-speaking consumers, one
might argue that "legalese" equally prevents true understanding of a con-
tract's terms by the poorly educated. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report
on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 115, 121 (1969). See Frosti-
fresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau Co. Dist.
Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup.
Ct. 1967); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302
N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969). At least one judge has found a standardized
motor vehicle instalment sales contract, which makes the dealer a guaran-
tor for the assignee bank, to be ambiguous and perhaps, unconscionable
because of its confused language and design. State Bank of Albany v.
Hickey, 29 App. Div. 2d 993, 994, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980, 981-83 (3d Dep't 1968)
(Gibson, P.J. dissenting), aff'd, 23 N.Y.2d 910 (1969).
86. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(1) (McKinney 1962).
87. Id. § 302(4).
88. Id. § 302(3). Delivery is not defined. See Atkin, supra note 52, at
1421.
89. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(3) (McKinney 1962). A similar RISA
provision, id. § 405, was used successfully in an action for recission in
Arnold v. Exterior Constr. Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 1054, 239 N.Y.S.2d 299 (Sup.
Ct. 1962). But see Gramatan Co. v. Jones, 23 App. Div. 2d 940, (3d Dep't
1965) (indicating that failure of contract delivery, while available in an
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The requirement that the buyer and seller sign the contract,
which, if the statute's terms are met, contains the full details of the
agreement, may cost the buyer many of his rights under MVRISA
and Truth-in-Lending" Often the seller's signature acts as an im-
mediate assignment of rights to the financer. The buyer's signature
is usually an acknowledgment that the contract has been received
and all required disclosures made." Absent actual knowledge to the
contrary, subsequent assignees can use the acknowledgment as con-
clusive proof that the buyer received the contract, 2 that it did not
contain any impermissible blank spaces, 3 and that it contained all
disclosures required by section 121 of the Truth-in-Lending Act. 4
These acknowledgments have been controversial. Arguing in
favor of their presumptive weight Professor Warren, a reporter of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) 95 has said:
affirmative action or counterclaim, is not good as a defense).
90. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Hull Chevrolet-Olds Corp., 43
Misc. 2d 412, 251 N.Y.S.2d 364 (County Ct. 1964).
91. Description based on contracts reviewed by the author while em-
ployed by OEO Legal Services.
92. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(8) (McKinney 1962).
93. Id.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (1970).
95. Under the UCCC, absent actual knowledge or a violation apparent
on the face of the instrument, an acknowledgment is presumptive evidence
of compliance with disclosure requirements in favor of the seller and con-
clusive evidence in favor of an assignee. UCCC § 2.302(3). COMMISSION ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, WORKING REDRAFT
No. 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as UCCC WORKING REDRAFT No. 4] has
deleted this provision. Since the conference committee which prepared this
draft had as one of its purposes "[e]limination of most of the provisions
on disclosure in view of the substantial preemption of this area by the
Congress by the Truth-in-Lending Act, and by Federal Reserve Board
Regulation 'Z'," the deletion is logical, Prefatory Note, UCCC WORKING
REDRAFT No. 4 at iii. Another purpose was "incorporation of many con-
sumer oriented provisions .... " Id. Consumer advocates are not yet
satisfied. See Shick, note 39 supra. This draft has not been accepted by
the Uniform Code Commissioners. Since the conference committee has yet
to consider carefully "[a]djustments that may be required by the evolving
law following Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation [sic], 395 U.S. 337
(1969)," Prefatory Note, UCCC WORKING REDRAFT No. 4, at iv., it is doubt-
ful this draft could be accepted by the Commissioners. See notes 172-192
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[ilf a statute imposes heavy penalties on a creditor for failing to give the
consumer a copy of a disclosure statement, it seems fair . . . to say that if
the consumer acknowledges that he received the copy there is a presumption
that he did. I don't know how else a creditor can protect himself, and pre-
sumptions are not hard to rebut where the consumer has been wronged."
Professor Warren's argument has merit if the presumption is rebutt-
able, if, as in Truth-in-Lending, penalties are heavy 7 and if the
policy behind the statute is not emasculated by unwitting acknowl-
edgment. Such is not the case with MVRISA. The New York City
Bar Association's Committee on Legislation strongly criticized the
acknowledgment provision when it was first under consideration in
the legislature." Professor Farnsworth termed it "unfortunate.""
The draftsmen of the National Consumer Act (NCA), a pro-
consumer model statute, would grant no evidentiary weight to ac-
knowledgments'"O since "merchants of all kinds attempt to defeat
legal requirements, especially of regulatory statutes, by having the
consumer sign a pro forma statement that they have been complied
with."'"' Moreover, the New York Legislature took a less stringent
approach in similar credit legislation. In the Retail Instalment Sales
Act (RISA)'0 2 which regulates non-automobile retail instalment
transactions, an acknowledgment merely creates a presumption in
favor of the assignee that the seller has delivered a contract in
compliance with the statute.'"3
infra and accompanying text (discussing Sniadach and its progeny). The
author understands that a fifth working redraft may be issued as this
comment goes to press. Unless otherwise indicated, all discussion of the
UCCC herein will relate to the official text only.
96. Memorandum from W.D. Warren to the UCCC Committee and
Staff, Re: The National Consumer Act 29 (Feb. 7, 1970) (on file at the
offices of the FORDHAM URBAN L.J.) [hereinafter cited as Warren Memo-
randum].
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1640 (1970).
98. Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Comm. on State Legis., Bull.
No. 8, at 513-14 (April 9, 1956).
99. Farnsworth, Commercial Law, 1957 Survey of New York Law, 32
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1401-02 (1957).
100. NCA § 2.409. The NCA represents a consumer-oriented response
to the UCCC by the Consumer Law Center, an OEO Legal Services back-
up unit.
101. Id. § 2.409, Comment.
102. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 401-22 (McKinney 1962), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
103. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 405 (McKinney 1962).
[Vol. II
MOTOR VEHICLE SALES
B. Assignment Free of Defenses
The essence of motor vehicle retail instalment credit, and its
abuses, lies in the movement of paper from dealers to financers °4
who are then free of defenses the buyer may have against the seller.
While the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),' °5 permits agreements
not to assert these defenses in enforcement actions by assignees,
consumer transactions may be exempted by other statutes and deci-
sions."" Under MVRISA, separately negotiated agreements prevent-
ing a buyer from using against an assignee causes of action or defen-
ses the buyer may have against the seller are barred.' °7 An exception
is made when the assignee acquires the contract in "good faith...
for value" and sends a notice of the assignment to the buyer.' 8
104. See notes 10 & 11 supra and accompanying text. N.Y. PERS. PROP.
LAW § 302(10) (McKinney 1962) gives financers and dealers great latitude
in arranging their transactions. The financer may purchase paper from the
seller at any mutually agreed upon price. No notice need be given the
consumer, and no filing of the assignment is required. For the assignment
to be effective the seller need not be "deprived of dominion over payments
...or over the vehicle if repossessed by or returned to the seller. .. '
Id. An assignment permitting the seller to keep such rights and duties
would be void as fraudulent under New York case law, Memorandum of
Joint Legislative Committee on Commerce and Economic Development,
reprinted, [19611 N.Y. Laws 1901. This provision was added to "facilitate
the assignability of retail instalment contracts . . . without detriment to
the instalment buyer." Id. The financer purchasing paper is thus freed of
the burden of repossession and storage.
105. The UCC provides the basic law of sales, UCC §8 2-101 to -725
(McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1973), and secured
transactions, UCC §§ 9-101 to -507 (McKinney 1964), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
106. UCC § 9-206(1) (McKinney 1964). MVRISA supplements but
does not supplant the UCC except in this instance. Early drafts of the code
would have denied third party freedom from defenses in consumer transac-
tons. Bank lobbying forced a change to the present form in the 1957 draft.
See Kripke, supra note 21, at 470; Gilmore, supra note 38, at 39-40.
107. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(9) (McKinney Supp. 1973). In effect
this provision means that negotiable instruments are barred. See UCC
§§ 3-104, -202 (McKinney 1964).
108. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(9) (McKinney Supp. 1972). Com-
menting on the statute in 1956, Professor Atkin saw that this provision
might "ultimately be of far greater benefit to finance companies than to
consumers." Atkin, supra note 52, at 1421. Professors Jordan and Warren
19731
78 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. II
Thus, "the legislature . . . placed certain instalment contracts al-
most on a par with negotiable instruments."'"9 While consumer in-
stalment contracts are technically not negotiable, the assignee can
obtain the primary protection afforded a holder in due
course-freedom from the defenses of a party to the contract "with
whom . . .[he] has not dealt.""'
Free negotiation of consumer credit contracts has come under
attack. Commentators have argued that a doctrine developed to
facilitate medieval commerce has little place in a consumer credit
transaction where "[i]ts negotiable character is of no importance
with respect to claims of ownership . . . .[and] [tihe only signifi-
cant consequence of the negotiability . . . is that it cuts off the
defenses of the maker."'
find that such provisions provide "the financial institution the best of all
worlds . . . .[Ilf the consumer has a defense and notifies the assignee,
the latter can decide whether to keep the paper or to send it back to the
dealer . . . if the consumer does not notify the assignee of the defense, the
assignee has a strong negotiating position with the consumer, who may be
told that he has lost his right to complain; and . . . if the consumer fails
to give notice the assignee has a strong position in suing the complaining
consumer since the statute seems to allow the financing institution to take
free even of fraud and of defenses that the consumer could not have known
about at the time of the assignment." Jordan & Warren, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 387, 435 (1968). The professors'
suggestion that the act permits an assignee to take free of a defense of fraud
is illustrated by Nassau Disc. Corp. v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1007, 255
N.Y.S.2d 608 (Civ. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 47 Misc. 2d 671, 262
N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1965). Discussing the parallel former RISA provi-
sion, the court noted that, under prior case law, fraud in the inducement
provided a defense against subsequent assignees "where fraud permeated
the contract so as to vitiate it. . . ." 44 Misc. 2d at 1009, 255 N.Y.S.2d at
611. The court reasoned that the notice provision permitted waiver even
in a case of fraud, but the assignee could be held to "the highest standard
of good faith . . . ." id. at 1011, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 613. The appellate deci-
sion might be read as setting a slightly lower standard of good faith. 47
Misc. 2d at 671, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 968. See also Mohawk Nat'l Bank v.
Chalifaux, 33 Misc. 2d 987, 227 N.Y.S.2d 526 (County Ct. 1962) (allowing
defense of fraud), rev'd, 18 App. Div. 2d 864 (3d Dep't 1963).
109. Bank of Commerce v. Ogden, 56 Misc. 2d 874, 875, 290 N.Y.S.2d
215, 216 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
110. UCC § 3-305 (McKinney 1964).
111. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 375,
378-79 (1971).
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Generally, legislative reform of these assignments has taken one
of three forms." ' The first bars an assignee from taking a negotiable
consumer note completely free from defenses that the buyer may
have against the seller."3 These provisions may limit the assignee's
liability to the amount owed him,"4 or permit assertion of certain
consumer rights as a defense. "5 Thus, the consumer's cause of action
to recover amounts already paid would still be against the seller."'
The second type of reform, initially proposed in the UCCC,"1 pro-
vides a mechanism protecting some consumers and some holders. A
seller may "not take a negotiable instrument other than a check as
112. The New York Legislature has also acted against "specious cash
sales" which, while not involving assignment, are similar in parties and
effects. Specious Cash Sales Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 252-55 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1973). It makes a lender liable with the seller for claims or
defenses arising out of a sale when the "creditor knowingly participated in
or was directly connected with such consumer sale," even though the loan
was separately negotiated. Id. § 253. A rebuttable presumption of such
knowledge and participation is found when the business or family relation-
ship of the creditor and seller are extremely close. Id. §§ 252, 254. All
"transactions involving the purchase of an automobile" are excluded. Id.
§ 255. See Legislative Note, New York Specious Cash Sales Act, 5 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 145 (1971); Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses:
Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272 (1969).
See also UCCC § 2.404(2).
113. E.g., UCCC § 2.404 (Alternative A); UCCC WORKING REDRAFT
No. 4 § 3.404; NCA § 2.405; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 42-136 (Supp.
1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1957); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403
(McKinney Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2455 (1970); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 63.14.150 (Supp. 1972). The FTC has proposed a rule barring
all waivers of defenses, and requiring statements which detail consumers'
rights and give them practical explanations of how to take advantage of
them. 36 Fed. Reg. 892, 1211 (1971) (initial release); 38 Fed. Reg. 892
(1973) (revised proposal). See Comment, Consumer Protection: Proposed
Federal Trade Commission Rule-Preservation of Buyer's Claims and De-
fenses in Consumer Installment Sales, 21 J. PuB. L. 169 (1972). The New
York State Legislature considered proposals to end waivers during the 1973
session. See S. 122, S. 163, A. 159, A. 236, A. 4114, 196th Sess. (1973).
114. E.g., UCCC § 2.404 (Alternative A.).
115. E.g., UCCC WORKING REDRAFT No. 4 § 3.404(2).
116. Shick, supra note 39, at 465-66.
117. UCCC § 2.403. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1804(2) (West 1973); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 325.141 (1966).
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evidence of the obligation of the buyer . . . ."I" An instalment
contract waiving a buyer's rights as to parties other than the seller
contravenes this provision. Accordingly a buyer retains his right
against third parties taking in violation of the requirement.' 9 How-
ever, a subsequent holder without notice that the paper was in
violation can take free of defenses.'20 The third reform is the "notice
approach" taken by MVRISA.' 2' Before an assignee can be freed
118. UCCC § 2.403. Essentially this provision bars use of promissory
notes.
119. This provision applies to negotiable instruments. Under the
UCCC it would be used in conjunction with either the first or third method
discussed, both of which regulate assignments. The UCCC WORKING
REDRAFTr No. 4 would bar "negotiable instrument[s] other than a cur-
rently dated check as evidence of the obligation of the consumer." UCCC
WORKING REDRAFT No. 4, § 3.307.
120. UCCC § 2.403, Comment; Comment, A Case Study of the Impact
of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the
Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 635 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Yale
Negotiability Study]; Statutory Comment, 56 MINN. L. REV. 510, 513
(1972). See generally Murphy supra note 39, at 318-20.
121. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(9) (McKinney Supp. 1973). In the
assignment situation UCCC § 2.404 (Alternative B) provides an option
similar to MVRISA's: "[A]n agreement by the buyer or lessee not to
assert against an assignee a claim or defense arising out of the sale or lease
is enforceable only by an assignee not related to the seller or lessor who
acquires the buyer's or lessee's contract in good faith and for value, who
gives the buyer or lessee notice of the assignment . . . and who, within 3
months after the mailing of the notice of assignment, receives no written
notice of the facts giving rise to the buyer's or lessee's claim or defense."
UCCC § 2.404 (Alternative B). The three month period at least covers
warranty periods on most consumer goods and used cars. The section also
provides that an assignee does not take in good faith if he "has knowledge
or, from his course of dealing with the seller . . . or his records, notice of
substantial complaints by other buyers . . .of the seller's . . . failure or
refusal to perform his contracts with them and of the seller's . . . failure
to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time after the assignee notifies
him of the complaints." UCCC § 2.404(2)'(Alternative B). Professors Jor-
dan and Warren, the reporters-draftsmen of the UCCC, while critical of
such notice provisions, supra note 108, note that the Alternative was a
compromise with financers who objected to Alternative A, under which an
assignee is liable up to the amount owed him for any rights or defenses held
by the buyer, asserted as a defense or set-off against a claim by the as-
signee.. Jordan & Warren, supra note 108, at 435. See Black, State Varia-
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from a buyer's defenses, he must send him a notice including a
detailed description of the vehicle.'22 If within ten days after mailing
the buyer does not notify the assignee in writing of defects in the
vehicle's description, condition, non-delivery, or other non-
compliance with the contract, the assignee is freed from any defen-
ses the buyer has against the seller. 23 The notice is a single sentence
of 125 words, written in technical language, with actual notice of the
assignee's freedom from defenses found in the last phrase.2 4 The
assignee's notice need not contain a return address but it must be
found somewhere in the material sent to the buyer. 5
The judiciary has recognized the incongruity of applying free ne-
gotiation theories to assignments of modern consumer contracts. In
numerous cases the veil of financer-seller relations has been pierced
and a bond found between the financer and the seller negating a
good faith taking without notice.'26 Courts have read MVRISA's
tions of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code: The Case for Legislative
Restraint, 48 DENy. L.J. 239, 250-53 (1971) (discussing treatment of these
alternatives in states adopting the UCCC).
122. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(9) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
123. Id.
124. Id. The subsection provides: "NOTICE: 1. IF THE WITHIN
STATEMENT OF YOUR TRANSACTION WITH THE SELLER IS
NOT CORRECT IN EVERY RESPECT; OR 2. IF THE VEHICLE OR
GOODS DESCRIBED IN OR IN AN ENCLOSURE WITH THIS NO-
TICE HAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED TO YOU BY THE SELLER OR
ARE NOT NOW IN YOUR POSSESSION; OR 3. IF THE SELLER HAS
NOT FULLY PERFORMED ALL HIS AGREEMENTS WITH YOU;
YOU MUST NOTIFY THE ASSIGNEE IN WRITING AT THE AD-
DRESS INDICATED IN OR IN AN ENCLOSURE WITH THIS NOTICE
WITHIN TEN DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THE MAILING OF THIS
NOTICE; OTHERWISE, YOU WILL HAVE NO RIGHT TO ASSERT
AGAINST THE ASSIGNEE ANY RIGHT OF ACTION OR DEFENSE
ARISING OUT OF THE SALE WHICH YOU MIGHT OTHERWISE
HAVE AGAINST THE SELLER."
125. Id. Enclosures the author has seen included a coupon book, insur-
ance notice and sundry promotional materials from the bank. See Kripke,
supra note 21, at 473 n.75; Schrag, supra note 85, at 122-23; Bank of
Commerce v. Ogden, 56 Misc. 2d 874, 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (Sup.
Ct. 1967).
126. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Jeffer-
son Credit Co. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct.
1969); Star Credit Corp. v. Molino, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ.
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assignment provision to protect the consumer. Although an assignee
must show he gave the notice'27 and strictly adhered to the Act's
requirements, 2 ' courts have on occasion not required literal con-
sumer compliance. In certain circumstances an oral notice of com-
Ct. 1969); Nassau Disc. Corp. v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1007, 255 N.Y.S.2d 608
(Civ. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 47 Misc. 2d 671, 262 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup.
Ct. 1965); Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Fernandez, 121 N.Y.S.2d 721
(Mun. Ct. 1952); Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53,
195 A.2d 115 (1963). The Fernandez court pointed to "unmistakable indi-
cia" of a lack of good faith: "[1] the contract provides that the payment
of all installments are to be made to the plaintiff bank . . . . [2] title...
is . . . retained by the holder, who is defined as either the seller or the bank
[3] the assignment appears to be made simultaneously with the
execution of it by the defendant, even before the television set was deliv-
ered to the defendant . . . [4] both the sale and assignment are physically
encompassed within the same document . . . ." [5] a bank official af-
firmed he was "thoroughly familiar" with the facts of the action. 121
N.Y.S.2d at 724. These indicia would appear to be present in many trans-
actions under MVRISA. See Nassau Disc. Corp. v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1007,
298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 47 Misc. 2d 671, 262
N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1965). At least one commentator has claimed a
joint venture liability theory could also be used to connect sellers and
financers. Shick, supra note 39, at 466. See also Murphy, supra note 39,
at 317; Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer
Paper, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177.
127. D.P.C. Corp. v. Jobson, 15 App. Div. 2d 861, 244 N.Y.S.2d 772
(4th Dep't 1962); Mill Factors Corp. v. Byas, 65 Misc. 2d 904, 319 N.Y.S.2d
40 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See also Coburn Corp. v. Orr, 60 Misc. 2d 912, 304
N.Y.S.2d 345 (Civ. Ct. 1969) (proper delivery of notice to buyer does not
preclude assertion of defenses by guarantor who did not receive notice).
128. Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d
391 (Civ. Ct. 1957). For analysis of similar provisions see Zenith Fin. Corp.
v. Jolly Gene Distrib. Inc., 42 Misc. 2d 821, 249 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct.
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 24 App. Div. 2d 507, 261 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d
Dep't 1965); Nassau Disc. Corp. v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1007, 255 N.Y.S.2d
608 (Civ. Ct. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 47 Misc. 2d 671, 262 N.Y.S.2d
967 (Sup. Ct. 1965). But see Chase Manhattan Bank v. McLeash, 55 Misc.
2d 1009, 286 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1968), holding that execution of a
completion certificate on a home improvement contract under RISA estops
assertion of a non-completion response to the notice of assignment. Judge
Gulotta entered a strong dissent urging literal reading of the statute. 55
Misc. 2d at 1014, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33. See also Bank of Commerce v.
Ogden, 56 Misc. 2d 874, 290 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (notice may not
be effective if placed on the back of communications with a debtor).
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plaints by the consumer has been held sufficient.' 9 Similarly, in one
instance where a consumer returned his payment book, without a
complaint letter, the assignee's attempt to enforce the agreement
free of defenses raised good faith problems.'3 ° Further judicial in-
roads are foreseeable. One court recently found that the legislature's
elimination of assignment free of defenses in RISA
is indicative of a policy increasingly designed to protect the buyer who may
have a meritorious cause for complaint against a seller and yet is confronted
by a demand for payment from a party with whom the buyer has no dealings,
a party moreover, who is customarily disinterested in any matter relative to
the product other than prompt payment. 3'
Assignment free of defenses is clearly inappropriate in the
MVRISA context. The courts have implicitly recognized the need
for reform,'32 and the legislature has barred such assignments in sale
of goods other than motor vehicles under the Retail Instalment
Sales Act.'33 Financer fear of increased risks is the main obstacle to
the elimination of these provisions. Professor Homer Kripke, gener-
129. Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Burt, 61 Misc. 2d 561, 306 N.Y.S.2d 557
(Civ. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 61 Misc. 2d 563, 306 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
As originally enacted, the operative language of the Act seemed to indicate
that defenses would not be cut off if an assignee had actual knowledge of
a buyer's complaints, while the statutory notice, note 124 supra, required
the consumer to send the assignee a written response detailing complaints
if he were to preserve his defenses. Law of April 16, 1956, ch. 633, § 302(9),
[19561 N.Y. Laws 1415. A 1963 amendment made the notice and statute
"consistent" by requiring written notice from the buyer of his complaints
under both provisions, as codified in N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(9)
(McKinney Supp. 1973). Memorandum of Joint Legislative Committee on
Commerce and Economic Development, reprinted, [1963] N.Y. Laws
2012-13. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
130. Nassau Disc. Corp. v. Allen, 47 Misc. 2d 671, 262 N.Y.S.2d 967
(Sup. Ct. 1965).
131. United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin Plaza Apts., 65 Misc. 2d
1082, 1085, 319 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (Civ. Ct. 1971). The court said that the
RISA provision "states a standard that is the measure of unconsciona-
bility." Id. at 1086, 319 N.Y.S,2d at 535. At least one student commentator
has argued that absent a knowing waiver, cut-off clauses may not only be
unconscionable but also may violate due process. Comment, Assignment
& Negotiation: A Violation of Due Process, 10 DUQUESNE L. REv. 92 (1971).
132. See notes 126-31 supra and accompanying text.
133. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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ally pro-creditor, has long considered this fear to be:
much ado about nothing .... [Tlhe banks seem to be obsessed with a need
to have a clear opinion of counsel on the enforceability of every piece of paper
instead of being content to establish loss reserves for the portion of their
receivables which statistics show is likely to be uncollectible because of de-
fenses good against the banks.'34
A Yale study,'35 compiled after cut-off provisions were barred in
Connecticut home improvement contracts,'36 supports Professor
Kripke's view. The study found that financer screening of fraudu-
lent salesmen increased'37 and dealer repurchase agreements were
used to obtain the protections previously afforded by cut-off
clauses."' "Incentive payments" to dealers were reduced.,39 Finance
charges or reserve account requirements were not significantly in-
creased"" and could be passed on to consumers, at least in part.'4'
Some small dealers, however, did suffer serious setbacks.'42 The
study predicts that the increased costs to the public will decline as
"over-reaction" subsides among financers and a more "rational cal-
culation of risks" develops.'43 Assuming that well spread risk is pre-
ferable to catastrophe for a few debtors, it is hard to object to most
of these changes. If the statistics are accurate, if abuse is as common
as the judiciary and commentators indicate, and if the original ra-
tionale for negotiability is as inapplicable to the current market as
134. Kripke, supra note 21, at 470. Kripke notes that the motor vehicle
contract may be an exception, since financer competition and dealer
deception of financers blocks their capacity to control dealer practices. Id.
at 471. But see note 11 supra pointing to the leverage financers obtain
through manipulation of loans for dealer floor stock. See notes 135-43 infra
and accompanying text discussing effects of ending cut-off financing. See
also Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations about Remedies in Consumer-Credit
Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 550-53 (1967) (another
creditor attorney critical of cut-off financing); Rosenthal, supra note 111,
at 380-81; Murphy, supra note 39, at 318.
135. Yale Negotiability Study, supra note 120.
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 42-136, -137 (Supp. 1972).
137. Yale Negotiability Study 638-39.
138. Id. at 640.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 653-54.
141. Id. at 642.
142. Id. at 646-47.
143. Id. at 655-56.
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it appears, then there is little reason to allow third party freedom
from defenses in motor vehicle retail instalment sales.
C. Void Terms
The most significant reform of credit practices provided by
MVRISA is a "laundry list" of prohibited contract provisions.'
These terms, if included in a contract, are void, but do not otherwise
affect the agreement's validity."' This reform attempts to preserve
a debtor's rights which have been signed away in adhesion con-
tracts.
1. Non-Default Protection
Any provision allowing the holder, absent default, to accelerate a
loan's maturity "arbitrarily and without reasonable cause" is
barred.'49 Although no cases have analyzed this standard, presuma-
bly a creditor is permitted to accelerate when the contract so pro-
vides in case of endangerment of collateral, lapse of insurance or
similar circumstances, provided the action is reasonable and not
simply a standardized reaction.'47 A confusing provision prevents
the seller from being "relieved from liability for any legal remedy
which the buyer may have had against the seller under the contract,
or any separate instrument executed in connection therewith."' 4
The key language in this provision is "under the contract." It is
doubtful that a right would be granted and waived in the same
agreement. Because of the requirement that all agreements must be
included in the contract,'49 a right created by an oral declaration
could not be recognized under the statute. Therefore, the debtor's
remedies referred to are those implicitly existing outside the written
144. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
145. Id. § 302(14).
146. Id. § 302(13)(a).
147. See UCC § 1-208 (McKinney 1964), providing that: "A term pro-
viding that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment
or performance or require collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or
'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar import shall be
construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The
burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the
power has been exercised."
148. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
149. Id. § 302(1).
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contract. For example, under the UCC an implied warranty of mer-
chantability exists when the seller is a merchant.'5 ° This warranty
is so basic it need not be written into the contract, 5' yet it is a right
the buyer has "under the contract."'' 2 The UCC permits waivers of
implied warranties if the waiver is sufficiently clear and conspicu-
ous.' 5 ' Because the UCC does not impair statutes regulating sales to
consumers,'54 MVRISA appears to bar most waivers of implied war-
ranties. 
5
2. Default: Protections and Dangers
MVRISA protects a buyer from harassment and wrongful repos-
session. It prohibits contract provisions waiving a cause of action for
any illegal acts committed in the course of collection or reposses-
sion.' 6 Nor can the contract authorize the creditor to enter a buyer's
150. UCC § 2-314 (McKinney 1964).
151. 1 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:14, at 537 (2d ed.
1970).
152. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
153. UCC § 2-316(2) (McKinney 1964).
154. Id. § 2-102.
155. A recent analysis of a similar Minnesota provision indicated that
"[tjhe intent seems to be to allow the consumer to voice his defenses in
court while not unreasonably restraining the seller's freedom to bargain.
Thus, for example, the statute should not be read to limit a merchant's
reasonable disclaimer of warranty, while it should prohibit the blanket
waiver clauses including all remedies against the seller." Statutory Com-
ment, 56 MINN. L. REv. 510, 516 (1972) (emphasis added). Waivers of
implied warranties and similar boilerplate provisions support unconscion-
ability defenses. See, e.g., Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d
138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,
53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Civ. Ct. 1967). The NCA draftsmen
would bar waivers of implied warranties. NCA § 3.302, Comments 1, 2. As
a practical matter, no real solution to warranty difficulties of automobile
buyers can be found until dealers are guaranteed adequate reimbursement
for repairs made under manufacturers' warranties. See Brown, supra note
11, at 761, 807-08. For the English approach to merchantability, see Yates,
Sale of Goods-Merchantable Quality and Consumer Protection, 123 NEW
L.J. 59-63 (1973).
156. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
These provisions provide limited protections against dunning. Some have
urged comprehensive regulation of such tactics in consumer credit legisla-
tion. Shick, supra note 39, at 467; NCA §§ 7.101-.303 and Official Com-
ments thereto.
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premises unlawfully, 57 commit a breach of the peace, ' or appoint
the holder as his own agent to facilitate collection or repossession.,"9
Likewise a clause accelerating the contract on repossession is pro-
hibited."" MVRISA also protects an allegedly defaulting buyer's
right to notice and hearing in certain instances. Confessions of judg-
ment "' and wage assignments' are barred. Because of the re-
stricted view courts take of these contract terms, the statutory pro-
tection is minimized.' 1 These limitations may, however, still be
necessary in spite of constitutional attacks on self-help reposses-
sion,'" and still be insufficient in light of abuses a defaulting con-
sumer faces after repossession.' 5
Confessed judgments and other means of collection without no-
tice and hearing may violate procedural due process in consumer
transactions. In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. "' the Supreme
Court upheld a cognovit note-a type of confessed judgment-be-
tween businessmen. The debtor had agreed to the note in order to
157. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1973). UCC
§ 9-503 (McKinney 1964) permits self-help repossession when accom-
plished without "breach of the peace," which is generally given a broad
common law definition. 4 ANDERSON, supra note 151, § 9-503:5, at 593.
For a discussion of financers' admitted failure to maintain procedures to
avoid breach of peace, see Squillante, Commercial Code Review, 74 COM.
L.J. 44 (1969). See also Clark, supra note 10, at 311.
158. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1973). Such
a provision was found unconscionable on its face in Kosches v. Nichols, 68
Misc. 2d 795, 797, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968, 970 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
159. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
160. Id. § 302(13)(g).
161. Id. § 302(13)(b). See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3201 (McKinney 1970)
barring entry of confessed judgment before default on consumer instalment
contracts under $1,500.
162. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(13)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973). See
also N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §§ 46-49 (McKinney 1962) regulating wage
assignments. The bar on confessed judgments and wage assignments also
prohibits execution of such instruments separate from the sales contract.
In re Finkelstein, 11 Misc. 2d 938, 174 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
[19571 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. 147.
163. See notes 166-73 infra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 182-92 infra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 197-205 infra and accompanying text.
166. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
19731
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
extend his debt."'7 Mr. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the court,
found that the petitioner "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly
waived the rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and
hearing. . . ."""' He noted:
Our holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of other
cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion, where there is great
disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the
cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue.'
In Swarb v. Lennox'7" the Court, in dicta, indicated that adhesive
confessed judgments might be unconstitutional where the right to
a hearing was not knowingly waived. 7' The Court's decision was
limited to approving the determination of a three judge court that
cognovit notes were not per se unconstitutional.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'72 the Court held that pre-
judgment garnishment of wages without notice or hearing "violates
the fundamental principles of due process."' 73 This decision has
prompted consumer forces to press for the elimination of other
collection practices which lack notice and hearing provisions. 7' In
Fuentes v. Shevin'75 the Court handed them a victory, holding Penn-
sylvania and Florida prejudgment replevin statutes violative of due
process. 7 ' Under these laws a party could obtain a writ of replevin
order the sheriff to seize specified property simply by applying
167. Id. at 178-82.
168. Id. at 187.
169. Id. at 188.
170. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
171. Id. at 199-201. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del.
1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971 (1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091,
1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
172. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
173. Id. at 342.
174. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972).
175. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and Mar-
shall joined in the plurality opinion. The Chief Justice and Justices White
and Blackmun dissented. Justices Rehnquist and Powell did not partici-
pate. See generally Note, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051 (1973).
176. 407 U.S. at 96. See Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (striking down a similar New York statute);
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 7102 (McKinney Supp. 1973) (amended statute to require
due process in prejudgment replevin proceedings).
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to a clerk or prothonotary.' Mr. Justice Stewart noted that hearing
and notice requirements raise "no impenetrable barrier" to repos-
session,' 8 while an absence of such requirements may result in an
"arbitrary deprivation of property.""'7 Further,
[ilf the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is
clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be
prevented .... [N]o later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact
that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due
process has already occurred."'
He concluded that "prejudgment replevin provisions work a depri-
vation of property without due process of law insofar as they deny
the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before chattels are taken
from their possessor."' 8
The logical step after Fuentes was an attack on self-help reposses-
sion.82 If a creditor cannot obtain a writ ordering a sheriff to replevy
without a hearing, perhaps he himself cannot repossess without one.
Applying such reasoning, courts have struck down statutes author-
izing innkeepers" 3 and landlords'84 to seize guest's and tenant's pos-
sessions to secure bills. Recently self-help repossession under the
UCC'1 has faced similar attack. The District Court for the Southern
District of California has found a lack of adequate due process pro-
tection. 86 The most difficult problem the court faced was finding
sufficient "state action" to support a cause of action under the due
177. 407 U.S. at 73-76.
178. Id. at 81.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 81-82.
181. Id. at 96.
182. As used herein "self-help repossession" is the procedure outlined
in UCC § 9-503 (McKinney 1964), to wit: "Unless otherwise agreed a
secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process
if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action."
See generally Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 t-LuRv. L. REV. 477, 563-
66 (1973).
183. Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 396-98 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 120-24 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
184. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 292-95 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
185. UCC § 9-503 (McKinney 1964).
186. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972). See Note,
13 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 1503 (1972).
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process clause. It reasoned that there was "ample indication that in
drawing up the agreements creditors were persuaded or induced to
include repossession by the fact that such repossession was permit-
ted by statute.""'7 Therefore, self-help repossession without notice
or hearing by legislative authorization was "under color of state
law"'' and violative of procedural due process."'" The District Court
for the Northern District of California, construing the same law,
reached an opposite result on the state action issue."" The District
Court for the Southern District of Florida likewise refused to find
state action and stated in dicta that, even had there been state
action, no due process violation would have existed." In addition,
though a due process right before repossession is found, courts may
allow knowing waivers of the right."2
Arguably, full due process protections for defaulting debtors
would raise the cost of credit thereby making it unavailable to the
marginal customer for whom the protection is designed.'93 The NCA
offers a potential alternative by prohibiting all non-judicial enforce-
ment 4 and requiring an expedited hearing on the issue of default
before permitting repossession.' 5 This proposal would seem to fall
within the Fuentes guidelines."'
187. 338 F. Supp. at 617.
188. Id. at 622.
189. Id.
190. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
191. McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.
Fla. 1971). See also Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972);
Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Ch.
1972).
192. Coogan, supra note 182, at 565-66.
193. See Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Note,
41 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1060-62 (1973). But see Wallace, The Logic of
Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461 (1973), arguing that due process
protections will not "increase the rate of default," id. at 462, increase
"uncollectable debts," id. at 464, or increase collection costs in the long
run, id. at 465.
194. NCA § 5.204. Non-judicial enforcement includes such activities
as self-help repossession and enforcement of innkeepers' and mechanics'
liens. See notes 183-85 supra and accompanying text.
195. NCA § 5.208. See Warren Memorandum, supra note 96, at 36-37
(urging adoption of a similar hearing procedure in the UCCC).
196. 407 U.S. at 67.
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Once a creditor has retaken a car he may resell it at a public or
private sale to recover the debt."'7 The difference between the
amount outstanding and the resale price plus costs of the sale is
recoverable from the debtor by a deficiency judgment.' 8 Although
"the method, manner, time, place and terms (of sale) must be com-
mercially reasonable,"'99 Professor Schuchman's study of 150 trans-
actions in Connecticut indicates that this standard' "" is openly
flaunted.3"' He found that typically the resale was from the financer
or assignee back to the seller or another dealer. ' The price paid
averaged 51 percent of retail Redbook value or 71 percent of whole-
sale Redbook value.0 3 The second sale, from the dealer to a new
retail buyer, averaged 92 percent of Redbook retail value.0 4 Because
197. UCC § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1964).
198. Id. § 9-504(2).
199. Id. § 9-504(3). See Clark, supra note 10, at 318, 321.
200. UCC § 9-504(2). For a detailed critique of Article 9's default pro-
visions effect on consumers, see Clark, supra note 10. Clark argues that
Article 9 fails to define default, id. at 308, promotes acceleration and
insecurity clauses, id. at 309, promotes repossession, id. at 311, guarantees
that deficiency judgments will be taken, id. at 312-13, and provides little
opportunity for redemption, id. at 315. See also, Skilton & Helstad,
Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1465 (1967); Speidel, Enforcing Security Inter-
ests in Consumer Goods: Some Notes on the Vicious Cycle, 7 U. RICHMOND
L. REv. 187 (1972). These provisions were among the most heavily lobbied
parts of the UCC. While early drafts provided consumer protections, the
final Code is less pro-purchaser than prior law under the Uniform Sales Act
§ 14 (1906). See Gilmore, supra note 38, at 27, 37-40, 44-48; Skilton &
Helstad, supra at 1468; Clark, supra note 10, at 307-08; Carroll, supra note
6 at 142-44, 151-52. A New York amendment of the Uniform Sales Act
permitted a consumer to challenge the reasonableness of a resale on default
if the contract was for $3,000 or less. Law of April 13, 1922, ch. 642, § 80(b),
[1922] N.Y. Laws 1773 (repealed 1964).
201. Shuchman, supra note 10.
202. Id. at 29.
203. Id. at 32. The Redbook is a publication of the National Automo-
tive Publishers which lists the wholesale, retail and finance values of cars
by model and year. Id. at 27 n.28. For New York cases illustrating similar
resales see Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Bacon, 19 Misc. 2d 773, 774,
186 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (County Ct. 1959); Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Mar-
cano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 140, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
204. Shuchman, supra note 10, at 32.
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of problems in valuing automobiles and determining the proper
market on which to base reasonableness, challenges are difficult to
make. 2"
5
Both the NCA and the UCCC would prevent a creditor from
taking deficiency judgments on small loans when the possibility of
abuse of the "commercial reasonableness" standard is high. The
UCCC prohibits collecting a deficiency where the "cash price" of
the goods is $1000 or less. 21  If the original price exceeds $1000, a
deficiency is allowed for the difference between the amount re-
couped and the unpaid balance. 27 The NCA bars collection of defi-
ciencies if the consumer owes $2,000 or more at the time of default. 2 ,
The deficiency would be determined by the "fair market value of
the collateral ' 201 which is presumed to be retail value based on
"periodically published trade estimates. ' '210
The New York Legislature has not sufficiently reformed
MVRISA's deficiency provisions. The sole change was the 1971
amendment which provided that when a vehicle is repossessed and
sold before the contract has been paid in full, any rebate to which
the debtor would have been entitled had he paid in full when the
205. Id. at 49-50. A study of repossession procedures in the District of
Columbia produced similar results. Comment, Business as Usual: An
Empirical Study of Automobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District
of Columbia, 3 CONN. L. REV. 511 (1971).
206. UCCC § 5.103. Since the term "cash price" is undefined, a buyer
who purchased a car with a price inflated to allow for a large trade-in would
face a loss of protection or protracted litigation. Shuchman, supra note 10,
at 47. Professor Warren has argued that the NCA § 5.212 "fair market
value" test be adopted in the UCCC to assure "that the creditor's sale
(usually to himself) will get a fair price ... " Warren Memorandum,
supra note 96, at 38.
207. UCCC § 5.103. The fourth revised draft of the UCCC provides
limited additional consumer protections by giving consumers notice of
their right to cure. UCCC WORKING REDRAFT No. 4 § 5.110, -11. These
provisions are very limited. See Shick, supra note 39, at 466. The Revised
Draft continues to leave default essentially to be defined by the creditor's
boilerplate. Id. Compare UCCC WORKING REDRAFT No. 4 § 5.108 with the
criticisms voiced by Clark, supra note 10, at 308, [and] Speidel, supra
note 200, at 194.





car was sold, must be deducted from the unpaid balance.2"
D. Charges Allowed
MVRISA limits insurance,212 refinancing," 3 and credit service
charge rates"' and regulates contractual provisions by which the
debtor automatically compensates the creditor for collection and
legal costs." '
1. Credit Service Charge
The permissible credit service charge rate"' is determined by the
motor vehicle's age. The rate on a new car is $7 per $100 per annum;
a used car, not more than two model years old is $10 per $100 per
annum; an older vehicle is $13 per $100 per annum.1 7 These rates
are computed on an add-on basis, rather than by fixed percen-
tages. 18 Thus, the charge is determined by multiplying the statu-
tory dollar amount by the number of hundreds of dollars of debt,
and the number of years in which the debt is payable. 9 A buyer
purchasing a four year old car with $1000 to be paid for in two years
would incur a $260 credit service charge. Using this method of com-
putation the effective annual percentage rate22 can be as high as 23
211. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 315 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
212. Id. §§ 303(1)(b), 302(6).
213. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 306 (McKinney 1962).
214. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
215. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 302(7) (McKinney 1962).
216. Id. § 301(8) defines credit service charge as "that part of the time
sale price by which it exceeds the aggregate of the cash sale price and the
amount, if any, included in a retail instalment sale for insurance and
official fees."
217. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
218. By expressing permissible rates in add-on terms the legislature
used a method rejected in the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1677 (1970). See McLean, supra note 63, at 200. A few creditors have
argued that add-on disclosures reflect the costs and risks they incur. See
Kripke, supra note 21, at 459.
219. See Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instal-
ment Credit, 66 MICH. L. REV. 81, 87-88 (1967).
220. Truth-in-Lending Act § 107(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1)
(A) (1970) defines annual percentage rate as "that nominal. . . rate which
will yield a sum equal to the amount of the finance charge when it is
applied to the unpaid balances of the amount financed, calculated accord-
ing to the actuarial method of allocating payments made on a debt be-
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percent.22'
In the only case on point, Bankers Commercial Corp. v.
Murphy,2 ' the Appellate Term held that the basis for the service
charge computation is the unpaid balance at the time of purchase.12
The lower court had favored a declining balance approach under
which the rate would be based on the debt remaining as each pay-
ment was made. 24 The respondent-debtor failed to appear before
the Appellate Term .22 The creditor appeared, and an amicus curiae
brief was filed by Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation. The court
accepted creditor arguments, terming it "unlikely" that the legisla-
tween the amount financed and the amount of the finance charge, pur-
suant to which a payment is applied first to the accumulated finance
charge and the balance is applied to the unpaid amount financed ... 
221. Johnson, supra note 219, at 88.
222. 28 Misc. 2d 609, 207 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
223. Id. at 611, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
224. Id. at 612, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
225. Id. at 610, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 781. The lack of an adversary proceed-
ing is evident in the tone of the decision. The court argues that its judg-
ment is in the consumer's interest, since he can compute his charges more
easily on a straight, rather than declining, balance. It accepts the creditor's
view that the add-on rate includes non-credit costs of risks. See notes 23
and 218 supra and accompanying texts. The court reasones: "[W]hile it
is composed partly of interest, the excess of the charge over legal rates
indicates that not only interest but a charge for the service and risk in-
volved in installment buying is intended. The scheme of the statute is that
this shall be equally distributed over the total period of the contract. If the
balance due after payment of each installment is to be the basis, fairness
would require that the installments be different and be based on the
amount then outstanding. The provision that the charge can be made only
if the installments are equal indicates, therefore, an intent contrary to the
interpretation below." 28 Misc. 2d at 611-12, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 782. The
court's distinctions confuse the law. As long as the time-price doctrine
stands, no part of the credit service charge is "interest." See notes 22-24
supra and accompanying text. Rather, the charge itself is based on a recog-
nition of the retailer's service and risk. If the service charge is, by its
nature, based upon the creditor's risks, costs, and services, then the declin-
ing balance method of calculation would do no injustice. As the outstand-
ing debt decreases, the services rendered and risks incurred decrease;
therefore the charge should decrease. This is the approach explicitly taken
by the legislature in regulating retail instalment credit agreements, N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW § 413(3) (McKinney Supp. 1973), and to a lesser degree,
retail instalment sales, N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 404(1) (McKinney 1962).
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ture's intent differed from its own statutory interpretation.2"' The
conclusion is debatable. MVRISA dictates that service charges are
to be computed in proportion to the time for repayment."2 7 If instal-
ments are unequal or irregular, the charge is to be computed with
"due regard for the schedule of instalments."'22 The language of the
law does not clearly establish that the basis for the computation is
either a declining balance or the contract price. However, a declin-
ing balance computation would be consistent with other New York
credit laws.22 If any legislative policy can be discerned in New
York's morass of credit legislation, it is to decrease interest and
service charges on long term loans or as the balance owed declines. 3
MVRISA is the only New York credit law which bases charges exclu-
sively on the type of chattel for which the credit is extended; and if
the court in Murphy is correct, it is also the only law wherein
charges are not related to the amount of credit or time for repay-
ment.23" ' Assuming that competition among credit grantors results in
lower rates,"' consistent regulation of all creditors would be prefera-
226. 28 Misc. 2d at 611, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
227. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303(2) (McKinney 1962).
228. Id. § 303(3). This provision would seem to defeat the argument
of the court in Murphy that the law gives the consumer a means to calcu-
late his balance easily.
229. See Felsenfeld, Uniform, Uniformed and Unitary Laws Regulating
Consumer Credit, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 212-16 (1968).
230. The confusion surrounding allowable charges is the result of the
number of laws scattered throughout New York statutes which have no
common basis for computation of rates. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW
§§ 14-a(2)(a)(10), 352(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y. BANKING LAW
§§ 108(1), 235(8), 173(1), 380(2), 453(5)(a) (McKinney 1971); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 46 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1973); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1973); N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 404(1), 413(3) (McKinney 1962).
231. See N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
232. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 108, at 336; UCCC § 2.201,
Comment. But see Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 53, 59 (1969) arguing that regulation of all
lenders under one statute would raise all rates to the previous maximum
and free entry into the credit market would only increase loan-sharking.
The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1970),
UCCC § 5.107 and NCA § 5.108 all place the gravamen of the offense of
loansharking on means of collection rather than on rates charged. Thus,
the concept of high rates as an evil in and of themselves seems to be falling
19731
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ble to the present hodgepodge.23 If, as creditors argue, rates must
be high on small loans because the risk of default and fixed expenses
are higher than on large loans,234 then an escalating add-on is non-
sensical. Fixed costs remain constant as the advanced amount in-
creases, and the credit service charge rate ought therefore to de-
crease. The risk borne in a motor vehicle transaction is likewise
diminished substantially by the existence of a regular resale market
where a creditor can recoup bad debts." '
Rate ceilings are ultimately matters of social and economic pol-
icy. Higher and lower ceilings affect the availability of credit and
risk spreading more than they affect creditor profits. Senator and
economist Paul Douglas noted:
"[H]igher or lower rate ceilings do not raise or lower finance company profits
but rather, determine credit availability. The higher the ceiling the more
marginal risk borrowers can be accommodated. This is confirmed by data
showing a high positive correlation between the rate ceiling and bad debt
charge-offs. The higher the ceiling, the riskier the loans and the higher the
incidence of bad debts.
Thus, the question of the proper rate ceiling is really a matter of social
policy rather than a contest between creditors and consumers. At what point
does a rate become so high that society expresses the judgment that it is
unconscionable and that the individual must do without the credit rather
than pay the unconscionably high rates?23
Given the inflationary consequences of consumer credit, economic
policy must also play a role in rate setting. The potential need to
regulate small loans for the economy's sake was recognized by Con-
gress in the enactment of the Credit Control Act.237 Section 205 of
the Act empowers the President, when he deems it necessary to
before free enterprise credit granting.
233. See note 230 supra and statutes cited therein.
234. Kripke, supra note 21, at 447.
235. See Johnson, supra note 219, at 102. Basing credit charges on the
nature of a lender's business, as MVRISA implicitly does, is anti-
competitive. Assuming a competitive credit market is desirable, such pro-
visions are unwise. Id. at 101.
236. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
MAJOR STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
FILED WITH THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 10, 11-12 (Jan.
29, 1969) (statement of Paul H. Douglas) [hereinafter cited as Douglas
Statement] citing J. Chapman & R. Shay, supra note 1, at 100.
237. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1901-09 (1973).
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control inflation, to authorize the Federal Reserve Board "to regu-
late and control any or all extensions of credit."238 Some authorities
predict eventual direct federal rate regulation. 3 '
The authors of the UCCC accept the view that allowing high rates
will open the credit market, and that competition will keep rates
well below the ceiling.24" Rates on consumer credit sales are set at
36 percent per year on unpaid balances up to $300; 21 percent from
$300 to $1000; 15 percent over $1000, or a straight 18 percent.24" ' The
Consumer Law Center did not advocate any particular rate in the
NCA, believing states should enact rates consistent with prior
law.' The drafters argue that:
[Nlo available data adequately supports the need for high rate ceilings
proposed in the UCCC, although such ceilings do exist in some states. The
important matter is that a state adopt a unified and consistent rate ceiling
statute which applies across the board to all creditors.113
MVRISA is inconsistent with other New York rate regulations. It
makes illogical delineations based on the nature of the lender and
the collateral. It does not seem to be based on clearly defined social
or economic policy. In light of modern thought on rate regulation it
should be reviewed and revised.
2. Refinancing Charges
If, subsequent to the initial agreement, the parties agree in writ-
ing to refinance the contract, extending payment on any instal-
ments, or deferring payments, the holder may charge an additional
$1 or one percent per month on any amount so extended.244 Extra
insurance premiums incurred because of the extension are charge-
238. Id. § 1904.
239. Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer
Credit Law, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 487, 515 (1970).
240. UCCC § 2.201 and Official Comments thereto; Johnson, supra
note 219, at 91. See also Smith, Some Reflections on Free Entry and the
Rate Ceilings Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 7 U. RICHMOND
L. REV. 235 (1973). Arguments against free entry are posed in Harper,
supra note 232.
241. UCCC § 2.201(2).
242. NCA § 2.201, Comments 1-4.
243. NCA § 2.201, Comment 2.
244. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 306(1) (McKinney 1962). The new
charges are not applicable to any period covered by the original agreement.
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able to the debtor."5 The parties may also agree to an entirely new
payment schedule.2 "' The holder must recompute the contract, de-
ducting from the outstanding debt any refund credit to which the
buyer would have been entitled had he paid in full.2"7 Additional
insurance, official fees, and accrued collection and deficiency
charges are then added.24 The maximum service charge allowed on
a refinanced agreement is based on the age of the car at the time of
the original agreement.2" Otherwise, the rate is computed as if it
were a new contract.
3. Other Charges
MVRISA regulates charges frequently found in retail instalment
agreements that are not directly related to the cost of credit, such
as insurance charges and official fees. If the cost of insurance and
its coverage are both reasonable, the debtor and creditor are pro-
tected. Unfortunately, these charges have been used to inflate serv-
ice charges. Under MVRISA insurance charges are restricted by
filings with the insurance commissioner25 and the service charge for
insurance is limited to $7 per $100 of the "amount included in the
contract for insurance . ".2..5" The creditor may also add official
fees necessary for the perfection of security interests.252 He is prohib-
ited from adding any other non-credit costs, such as fees for credit
investigation. 253
4.- Charges on Default
MVRISA permits the parties to contract for the creditor to receive
a five percent delinquency and collection charge on each instalment
in default for more than ten days. 54 Neither "delinquency" nor
"collection" charges are defined by the act. The UCC may, however,
245. Id.
246. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 306(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
247. Id. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 305 (McKinney 1962) details the
method of computing refund credits.
248. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 306(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
249. Id.
250. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
251. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
252. Id. § 303(4).
253. Id.
254. Id. § 302(7) (McKinney 1962).
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place limits on them. It permits the liquidation of damages in an
agreement "only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasability of otherwise
obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is void as a penalty." '255 MVRISA also permits
the parties to contract for attorney's fees incident to the buyer's
default not exceeding 15 percent of the "amount due and payable
under such contract, ' 256 plus court costs. These are subject to the
reasonableness provisions of the UCC.257 Thus, MVRISA permits
the debtor's burden after judgment to be increased by twenty per-
cent more than his default. In practice, the attorney's fee provision
is particularly susceptible to challenge. The UCC allows attorney's
fees as an expense chargeable against the proceeds of the sale of
repossessed chattel if the fee is reasonable, provided for in the agree-
ment, not otherwise prohibited by law, and actually incurred by the
secured party. 258 These criteria limit the MVRISA provision. Until
recently New York courts consistently upheld attorney's fee provi-
sions in contracts.259 Lately courts have ruled that such provisions
are enforceable only if the fees are reasonable; otherwise, they are
void as a penalty.260
Professor Shuchman terms as "arbitrary and high" the attorney's
fees fixed by the terms of most motor vehicle retail instalment
agreements.2"' In his study "[e]very deficiency-judgment case ex-
255. UCC § 2-718(1) (McKinney 1964).
256. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(7) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
257. See text accompanying note 255 supra and note 258 infra.
258. UCC § 9-504(1)(a) (McKinney 1964).
259. See, e.g., Commercial Inv. Trust Inc. v. Eskew, 126 Misc. 114, 212
N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1925). Since enacting the Field Code the legislature
has generally avoided permitting awards of attorney's fees as part of costs
and disbursements, believing "the amount of an attorney's fees was pro-
perly a matter for negotiation between lawyer and client." 8 J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN & A. MILLER, N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE § 8301.04 (1972).
260. E.g., Scheible v. Leinen, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup.
Ct. 1971); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Marsi Dress Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 363, 303
N.Y.S.2d 179 (Civ. Ct. 1969); Franklin Nat'l Bank, v. Wall St. Comm.
Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 1003, 244 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 21 App.
Div. 2d 878, 251 N.Y.S.2d 892 (2d Dep't 1964). For the approach in other
jurisdictions see Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 288 (1951).
261. Shuchman, supra note 10, at 34.
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amined [a total of 150 cases] had a 15-percent attorney's collection
fee. ""' These included default judgments as well as contested ac-
tions.'" These clauses are particularly unfair since "no creditor of a
businessman can impose such standardized costs, charges, and
fees." 4 The Supreme Court has pointed to attorney's fees provi-
sions as indications of the enormous leverage creditors have in con-
sumer transactions. 26 5
Outside of MVRISA some legislative changes have occured. A
1971 amendment of RISA expressly bars attorney's fees provi-
sions.211 In approving the amendment, Governor Rockefeller stated
that "purchasers because of lack of education or experience in buy-
ing, enter into contracts which they do not understand and whose
obligations they are not prepared to meet. Under present law, upon
default, these purchasers may be forced to bear substantial legal
costs which they had never anticipated and which they are ill-
prepared to pay. 27
The NCA would bar attorney's fees provisions 26 and all other
collection expenses except "reasonable expenses incurred in disposi-
tion of collateral."2 6 The UCCC offers states the alternatives of
barring attorney's fees provisions 27 or limiting them to a "reasona-
ble" amount not over "15 percent of the unpaid debt after de-
fault. ' 2 ' Limited delinquency or deferral charges are likewise al-
lowed .272
E. Remedies and Penalties
MVRISA's weak penalty provisions for its violators have been
262. Id. (footnote omitted).
263. Id. at 38.
264. Id. at 34.
265. Snaidach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341 (1969).
266. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 402(6-a) (McKinney Supp. 1973). Propos-
als to amend MVRISA to conform it to RISA were proposed in the 1973
New York Legislature. S. 916, A. 1088, 196th Sess. (1973).
267. Governor's Memorandum, reprinted, [1967] N.Y. Laws 1544.
268. NCA § 2.410.
269. Id. § 2.412.
270. UCCC § 2.413 (Alternative A).
271. Id. (Alternative B). See Black, supra note 121, at 254-55 indicating
that all states which have adopted the UCCC have accepted this Alterna-
tive.
272. UCCC § 2.205.
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termed its "greatest deficiency." 7 ' RISA,274 the UCCC75 and the
NCA26 all provide stricter penalties. Without strong penalties con-
sumer credit regulations are ineffectual since the expense of fighting
abusive practices is often prohibitive. Thus, it is more profitable for
creditors to break the law and incur occasional penalties.
277
In addition to voiding prohibited contract 29 terms and allowing
the buyer to cancel the transaction when the seller does not deliver
the contract, 29 MVRISA provides that any willful violation of cer-
tain provisions is a misdemeanor.2 0 A willful violation of the sec-
tions setting credit service charge rates28' on the requirements of the
273. Law and Poverty Symposium-Consumer Protection in New
York, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 522, 539 (1968). Penalty provisions in consumer
credit regulations are as disordered as rate structures. See note 230 supra
and accompanying text. The time-price doctrine is the source of this chaos.
"Lenders have traditionally been allowed to exceed the usury rates only if
they have been licensed, while sellers have the time-price doctrine to thank
for their exemption from the usury laws and the concomitant licensing
requirement. Lenders have had to go to the legislature as petitioners seek-
ing dispensation from the usury laws, and they have paid a heavy price
for it in subjecting themselves to administrative control of every aspect of
their business. On the other hand the legislature has had to come to the
retailers, for until recently they have had no need for legislative legiti-
mization of their credit operations. It is not surprising that retailers have
come off with a decidedly lighter burden." Jordan & Warren, supra note
108, at 418. See also Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in
Consumer-Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 535, 536-38
(1967).
274. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 414 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
275. UCCC §9 5.202-.203.
276. The NCA provides escalating penalties depending on the nature
of the violation. See NCA 99 3.203, 5.301, 5.305.
277. Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Market-
place: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
357, 361 (1972). MVRISA penalties would have been strengthened by S.
661, S. 2380, S. 2244, A. 136, A. 3313, 196th Sess. (1973) all of which failed
to pass the New York Legislature.
278. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(14) (McKinney Supp. 1973). See
notes 141-165 supra and accompanying text.
279. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 302(3) (McKinney 1962). See notes 88-
89 supra and accompanying text.
280. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 307(1) (McKinney 1962). The penalty
upon conviction is a fine not exceeding $500. Id.
281. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 303 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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contract 2 ' bars "recovery of any credit service charge, delinquency
or collection charge, or refinancing charge. . . ."2 The most severe
penalties for a MVRISA violation are provided in the Vehicle and
Traffic Law" and under the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act!," Un-
der the former, the Motor Vehicle Commissioner is authorized to
deny, suspend, or revoke the registration of any dealer who "has
willfully violated"2 " MVRISA. Since the federal statute" 7 is incor-
porated in MVRISA2 and the New York Penal La,2 ' a violation
of its disclosure requirements 2111 subjects a creditor to sanctions
under both laws. The seller may avoid liability "for any such failure
to comply" with MVRISA if he corrects his violations within ten
days after receiving written notice of them.2'
282. Id. § 302.
283. Id. § 307(2) (McKinney 1962). Since the civil penalties are applic-
able only to two sections, other rights granted under MVRISA are under-
protected. Thus the Act provides that after the buyer has paid the debt
and requested cancellation of the contract the holder must send him "good
and sufficient instruments to indicate payment in full and to release all
security in the motor vehicle." Id. § 304. Under RISA, failure to send such
an instrument would be grounds for a civil action to recover service charges
paid. Id. § 414. Under MVRISA, a buyer is limited to recovery of a $100
penalty and "any loss" caused by the failure as provided by UCC § 9-504
(McKinney 1964). See Tyler v. Eastern Disc. Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1002, 286
N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
284. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 415(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1973). See
also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney 1972) providing for an Attorney
General's action against corporations using fraudulent or illegal business
practices; People v. ITM Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
285. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970). A willful violation of disclosure re-
quirements can result in a $5000 fine and a year in prison. Id. § 1611.
286. N.Y. VEH. & TRAr. LAW § 415(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
287. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970).
288. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 302(5)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
289. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.50 (McKinney Supp. 1973). A violation of
this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Id.
290. Truth-in-Lending Act § 121, 15 U.S.C. § 1631 (1970); Regulation
Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6-.8 (1973).
291. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 307(3) (McKinney 1962). Absent written
notice he may correct any violation at any time and free himself from




MVRISA's provisions give the buyer less protection than he was
afforded by statutes in effect before MVRISA. Under those statutes
"the entire credit service charge could be recovered by the buyer
from the original seller 'in case of failure to comply' "with the law." 2
RISA essentially follows the prior law by permitting recovery of
charges already imposed.2"3 The buyer may be given added protec-
tion by an interpretation of RISA which broadly construes "delin-
quency"2 4 to include any payments other than those due for "goods
or services actually delivered or supplied.""29
UCC remedies are also available to the parties.2 ' Potentially, the
most powerful of these is the defense of unconscionability.2 7 Since
unscrupulous creditors seem able to develop new abuses as soon as
old ones are outlawed, a flexible unconscionability doctrine is vital
for consumer protection.2 The New York courts have failed to de-
velop such a doctrine. The potential force of unconscionability was
undermined in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso299 when the court re-
fused to enforce excessive charges in a contract, but allowed reason-
able expenses and profits instead of forcing the unconscionable mer-
chant to forego profit.' ° Most New York State courts outside the
New York metropolitan area do not seem to have discovered uncon-
292. Atkin, supra note 52, at 1421 (footnote omitted).
293. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 405 (McKinney 1962). See Farnsworth,
supra note 99, at 1402.
294. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 414(4) (McKinney 1962).
295. Ben Constr. Corp. v. Snushall, 44 Misc. 2d 878, 881, 254 N.Y.S.2d
948, 952 (Sup. Ct. 1964). This reading is consistent with the general rule
that "where the penalty is of a remedial nature and is designed primarily
to safeguard private rights, the statute is not strictly construed." Tyler v.
Eastern Disc. Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 1002, 1007, 286 N.Y.S.2d 948, 953 (Sup.
Ct. 1968).
296. See generally UCC §§ 2-701 to 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
297. UCC § 2-302 (McKinney 1964).
298. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 108, at 423.
299. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
See Kripke, supra note 21, at 483 n.109 criticizing the decision. See also
Pearson v. National Budgeting Sys. Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 792, 297
N.Y.S.2d 59 (1st Dep't 1969). Awards of punitive damages to victimized
consumers may still help to deter abusive businessmen. See Star Credit
Corp. v. Ingram, 170 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Civ. Ct.) (July 3, 1973).
300. 54 Misc. 2d at 120, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
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scionability:"' At the present stage of its development it remains a
nebulous concept. Early authorities deemed it an agreement "such
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the




The UCC provides no definition of unconscionability. The NCA °'
and UCCC °4 both offer more precise definitions." 5 At the behest of
301. No consumer unconscionability cases under UCC § 2-302
(McKinney 1964) have been reported outside of the New York metropoli-
tan area. Consumer cases in the New York area supporting an unconscion-
ability defense include: Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298
N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Paragon Homes Town House, Inc. v. Carter,
56 Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Lazan v. Huntington
Town House, 69 Misc. 2d 1017, 332 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct.
1969); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757
(Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Misc. 2d 119,
281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72
Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972); Educational Beneficial, Inc.
v. Reynolds, 67 Misc. 2d 739, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Kosches
v. Nichols, 68 Misc. 2d 795, 327 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Jefferson
Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct.
1969); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391
(Civ. Ct. 1967). Cases denying an unconscionability defense alleged by a
consumer include: Pearson v. National Budgeting Sys. Inc., 31 App. Div.
2d 792, 297 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1st Dep't 1969); Zachary v. R.H. Macy & Co., 66
Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd on other grounds,
39 App. Div. 2d 116, 332 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds,
31 N.Y.2d 443, 293 N.E.2d 80, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972); Star Credit Corp.
v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
302. Greer v. Tweed, 13 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 427, 429 (N.Y.C.P. 1872). For
a modern definition see Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
303. NCA §§ 5.107, 6.109.
304. UCCC § 6.111(3).
305. The UCCC and NCA approaches differ in several respects. The
UCCC list only applies as criteria for actions by the credit administrator
in actions to enjoin a pattern of unconscionable conduct. UCCC
§ 6.111(1). The consumer's unconscionability defense is left undefined. Id.
§ 5.108. The NCA list applies to both types of action. NCA §§ 5.107,
6.109. While the UCCC provides for reformation or cancellation of uncons-
cionable contracts, the NCA permits recovery of punitive damages.
Compare UCCC § 5.108 with NCA § 5.303. The UCCC only applies to the
contract as of the time it was made. UCCC § 5.108. The NCA includes
creditor conduct after the contract is made. NCA §8 5.107, 6.109. Profes-
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both creditor and consumer groups, °6 they present litanies of un-
conscionable practices without limiting the concept to these listed
practices.
A fundamental problem facing consumer advocates and responsi-
ble financers is that abuses cannot be remedied so long as consum-
ers do not know their rights, do not know that they have rights, and
face prolonged expensive litigation when they seek to assert them.' 7
The scope of the problem is immense. Remedies proposed include
expanded class actions,101 award of attorney's fees to debtors in suc-
sor Warren has suggested that the latter NCA provision be included in the
UCCC. Warren Memorandum, supra note 96, at 34. 'To date, the sugges-
tion has not been accepted, although Working Redraft No. 4 does indicate
that unconscionability in the inducement of a contract may make it un-
conscionable. UCCC WORKING REDRAFT No. 4, supra note 98 at § 5.108.
The NCA would make unconscionability a question of fact. NCA § 5.107.
Under UCC § 2-302 (McKinney 1964), and under UCCC § 5.108 it is a
question of law.
306. Jordan & Warren, supra note 108, at 426; Warren Memorandum,
supra note 96; NCA § 5.107, Comment 1.
307. See Jones & Boyer, supra note 277, at 357-64; Mussehl, supra note
1, at 1133.
308. Spanogle, Why Does the Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
Code Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039 (1968); Spanogle,
The UCCC-It May Look Pretty, But is it Enforceable?, 29 OHIO STATE
L.J. 624 (1968); Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW.
663 (1970). The effectiveness of the consumer class action in New York was
emasculated by Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 259 N.E.2d 720, 311
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1970), which dismissed a class action seeking penalties for
violation of RISA provisions setting minimum contract type size on
grounds that plaintiff purchasers who had already signed contracts, failed
to show sufficient "common interest." Id. at 400, 259 N.E.2d at 721, 311
N.Y.S.2d at 282. The court found no "rational nexus" among the several
,agreements. Id. at 402, 259 N.E.2d at 722, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 284. See Note,
39 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (1971). Such an action, however, might be main-
tainable under Federal Rule 23, FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Compare Zachary v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) with Zachary v.
R.H. Macy & Co., 66 Misc. 2d 974, 323 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 39 App. Div. 2d 116, 332 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't), rev'd
on other grounds, 31 N.Y.2d 443, 293 N.E.2d 80, 340 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1972),
[and] Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill.
1972). However, Rule 23 has been limited by the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), holding that small claims
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cessful challenges, °0 no fault insurance for creditors,3 0 provisions for
arbitration of claims,"' expansion of neighborhood legal services,32
development of strong credit administrators, 3 and quasi-judicial
proceedings. 3 4 It is impossible within the limits of this comment to
discuss any of these proposals in detail. Obviously, however, any
penalty is ineffective unless adequate procedural devices are devel-
oped. Low cost, speedy, effective and fair methods of enforcement
are vital.3 5
IV. Conclusion
Mass production of the automobile and the consumer credit mar-
ket grew together.3 Just as the motorcar has had dangerous side
effects, so too has consumer credit. Just as social and political policy
have molded laws regulating automobile safety and construction, so
too the time has come for a broad view to be taken in drafting
consumer credit legislation.
Obviously much of MVRISA is inadequate; some provisions are
obtuse,3 7 some are inconsistent with other credit laws" 8 and some
destroy the common law rights of consumers.39 A notorious creditor
who somehow manages to violate the law is not effectively penal-
ized. The simple solution is to urge reform of MVRISA-this is a
minimum. The method of computing service charges,320 and the
exact nature of unwaivable rights must be delineated. 2 ' Service
cannot be aggregated to reach the requisite $10,000 jurisdictional mini-
mum.
309. See note 52 supra; Littlefield, supra note 24, at 15.
310. Jones & Boyer, supra note 277, at 365-66.
.311. Id. at 369-80.
312. Mussehl, supra note 1, at 1093.
313. UCCC §§ 6.101-.415; NCA §§ 6.101-.502; Jordan & Warren,
supra note 108, at 417; Littlefield, supra note 24, at 16.
314. Jones & Boyer, supra note 277, at 386-406.
315. See Littlefield, supra note 24, at 13; Freese, Legislative Overview
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code . . . A 1971 Perspective, 48 DENV.
L.J. 27, 39 (1971); Jones & Boyer, supra note 277, at 359-64.
316. See notes 1, 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
317. See notes 84, 108, 148-55, 222-35 supra and accompanying text.
318. See notes 229-35, 273-76 supra and accompanying text.
319. See notes 104, 108 supra.
320. See notes 216-36 supra and accompanying text.
321. See notes 146-62 supra and accompanying text.
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charge computation should, at least, be consistent with RISA,22 and
assignment should not cut off all defenses." '2 Waivers of warranties
should be barred.2 4 "Commercial reasonableness" under the UCC
must be defined to protect defaulting motor vehicle buyers32 and
must be used as a standard in such sales.
Revision of MVRISA is not sufficient. Despite their comprehen-
sive scope, New York consumer credit statutes are full of inconsis-
tencies. A buyer of a $500 new refrigerator has more rights than one
who buys a $500 used car.32 6 Credit service charges and interest rates
are a hodgepodge.3" Penalties are rarely sufficient and are generally
inconsistent."' The practical and legal effects of repossession are
particularly in need of legislative reform.2 9 In sum, uniform con-
sumer credit legislation, which protects consumers while recogniz-
ing the legitimate needs of legitimate businessmen, is a necessity.
Policy decisions, not yet made in New York, must underlie such
legislation. Lawmakers must decide whether they support free entry
into the credit market. They must decide whether to establish stan-
dards to prevent unscrupulous creditors from continued participa-
tion in the market, and whether criminal laws or licensing statutes
will serve this purpose.
In framing such legislation, the legislators must recognize two
basic truths of consumer credit. First, the law of contract, philo-
sophically free as it may be, is changing with the rise of the con-
sumer form contract.3 Second, the purpose of retail instalment
credit is to encourage sales and is not a profit tool in and of itself.
It is "a valuable and convenient tool to facilitate the production and
exchange of goods and services to the mutual benefit of business and
the consumer. ' '33' MVRISA is but an example of a consumer credit
law which does not fully reflect these truths. The need for reform is
obvious.
322. See notes 225, 230 supra and accompanying text.
323. See notes 104-43 supra and accompanying text.
324. See notes 148-55 supra and accompanying text.
325. See notes 197-210 supra and accompanying text.
326. See notes 225, 230 supra.
327. See notes 229-36 supra and accompanying text.
328. See notes 273-77 supra and accompanying text.
329. See notes 182-210 supra and accompanying text; Swarb v. Lennox,
405 U.S. 191, 202 (1972).
330. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text.
331. McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of Consumer
Credit, 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 387, 407 (1967).
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